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Introduction 
One would be hard pressed to find a more eloquent summation of 
the rights the Fourth Amendment protects than this one by Justice 
Brandeis:  
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the 
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal 
liberty and private property, where that right has never been 
forfeited . . . .1  
The Fourth Amendment’s goal of protecting citizen privacy “against 
unreasonable searches and seizures”2 has been the major driving force 
behind much of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence.3 As such, ever since the Court’s seminal ruling in Katz v. 
United States, the Court has held that warrantless searches that 
encroach upon a citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy are uncon-
stitutional.4 Holding otherwise would “erode the privacy guaranteed 
by the Fourth Amendment.”5 
 
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474–75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); see also 5 William Blackstone, Commentaries *223 
(“[T]he law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the 
immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never 
suffer it to be violated with impunity.”). 
2. U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
3. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[W]hat 
[citizens] seek[ ] to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.” (citations omitted)); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“In the home . . . all details are 
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying 
government eyes.”); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610–11 (1999) (“[T]he 
‘overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded 
in our traditions since the origins of the Republic’ [means] that absent a 
warrant or exigent circumstances, police [can] not enter a home to make 
an arrest.” (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980))); 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984) (“Indiscriminate 
monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view would 
present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape 
entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.”); Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary 
intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—
is basic to a free society.” (emphasis added)). 
4. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a 
twofold requirement [for determining whether a warrantless search is 
constitutional], first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”); id. at 353 (majority 
opinion) (“The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and 
recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he 
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But despite the Court’s long-established practice of protecting 
citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy, many commentators have 
expressed concern as to whether the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test developed in Katz will continue to adequately protect citizens’ 
Fourth Amendment rights in this age of ever-advancing technology. 
One commentator argues that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test “has proven more a revolution on paper than in practice 
[and] . . . [a]s a result, courts . . . have rejected broad claims to 
privacy in developing technologies with surprising consistency.”6 
Another argues that “Katz was a ruling without substance” and that 
it has done “little to protect Fourth Amendment liberties.”7 Still 
other commentators argue that, in light of the privacy concerns raised 
by modern technology, the reasonable expectation of privacy test 
should be abandoned altogether.8 Based on the tone of such 
commentary and the undeniably rapid advance of modern 
technologies, one might conclude that the death knell has already 
sounded for the reasonable expectation of privacy test. But contrary 
to such analysis, the state of the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is not as dire as some commentators make it out to be.  
This Note seeks to defend the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test and demonstrate that it more than adequately protects citizens’ 
 
justifiably relied . . . and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). The Court first used the 
phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” in Terry v. Ohio, noting that 
the Court “recently held [in Katz v. United States] that ‘the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places,’ and wherever an individual 
may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ he is entitled to be 
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 9 (1968) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
5. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28.  
6. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, 
807 (2004); see also Russell L. Weaver, The Fourth Amendment, 
Privacy and Advancing Technology, 80 Miss. L.J. 1131, 1137–38 (2011) 
(arguing that, while the reasonable expectation of privacy test initially 
seemed to promise greater Fourth Amendment protection from 
advancing technology, it “has not lived up to that promise for a variety 
of reasons, including the fact that the Katz test has been narrowly 
construed and has not easily adapted to new technologies”). 
7. Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth 
Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 Miss. L.J. 51, 
56, 58 (2002); see also Lewis R. Katz & Carl J. Mazzone, Safford United 
School District No. 1 v. Redding and the Future of School Strip 
Searches, 60 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 363, 373 (2010) (“[In the decades 
following Katz,] the Court’s focus on the warrant requirement and the 
requirement that exigency support warrantless searches [has] faded . . . .”). 
8. Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the Right to be Secure, 41 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 977, 1026 (2008).  
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Fourth Amendment rights, even in the face of rapidly advancing mod-
ern technology. Despite heavy academic criticism of the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, both Supreme Court and lower federal 
court cases provide little reason to worry that the test is ill suited for 
protecting citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. Indeed, just this past 
term the Court held that an unwarranted search using GPS tracking 
technology violated the Fourth Amendment.9 Though Justice Scalia’s 
majority opinion reached this conclusion by relying on fundamental 
concepts of trespass,10 the concurrences of Justices Sotomayor11 and 
Alito12 strongly suggest that five justices are prepared to recognize 
that extensive, unwarranted GPS surveillance of a citizen violates 
reasonable expectations of privacy.13 Most importantly, all nine jus-
tices ruled in favor of protecting the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights from an advanced technology. This holding, combined with the 
language of many of the Court’s earlier Fourth Amendment decisions, 
demonstrates that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is more 
than capable of protecting citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights from 
such technologies.  
Since the development of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test in 1967, the Court has taken surprisingly few opportunities to 
rule on Fourth Amendment cases dealing with advanced technology. 
Before Jones in 2012 and Kyllo v. United States14 in 2001, which dealt 
with infrared imaging, the most advanced technology the Court had 
dealt with in the Fourth Amendment context was aerial photography 
from airplanes in 198615 and from helicopters in 1989.16 This absence 
of Supreme Court precedent dealing with truly modern technology 
indicates that calls for Katz’s demise are, at the very least, premature. 
It is no secret that the Court often takes its time before ruling on 
 
9. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
10. Id. at 952, 953 n.8 (“By attaching the device to the Jeep, officers 
encroached on a protected area [and thus violated the Fourth 
Amendment because] . . . [t]he Fourth Amendment protects against 
trespassory searches.”). 
11. See id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
12. See id. at 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring).  
13. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy.”); id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with Justice 
Alito that, at the very least, longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.” 
(quotation marks omitted)). 
14. Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27 (2001). 
15. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
16. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).  
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important issues, giving the issues time to percolate in the lower 
courts, and the Court seems to be adopting this approach here.17  
Further, in the only two Fourth Amendment and technology cases 
the Court has heard during this century, Kyllo and Jones, the Court 
ruled in favor of the defendant and thus actually served to protect 
citizens’ privacy—not erode it. This is more evidence of the Court’s 
steadfast adherence to the importance of protecting the privacy of 
citizens and indicates that the Court will continue to apply the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test in a manner that protects 
citizens’ Fourth Amendment interests from modern technology.  
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I briefly explores the state 
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence prior to Katz and the develop-
ment of the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Part II then 
discusses the Court’s seminal decision in Katz and interprets the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test. Part III surveys the Court’s 
post-Katz decisions that have dealt with the Fourth Amendment and 
technology. Part IV analyzes the language found in many of these 
cases and applies it to recent scholarly criticism of Katz and the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test. Part IV concludes that these 
rulings indicate that the Katz formulation of the Fourth Amendment 
has and will continue to live up to the task of protecting citizens’ 
Fourth Amendment rights from modern technology because the Court 
has steadfastly protected privacy in the home and has also 
demonstrated willingness to protect certain privacy interests outside 
the home as well. Part IV also examines how several lower courts 
have applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test in a manner 
that has protected Fourth Amendment rights from advancing technol-
ogy. Finally, Part V briefly explores whether the judiciary or 
legislative branch is best suited for determining citizens’ privacy 
rights in the face of rapidly advancing technology. Part V concludes 
that there are benefits and drawbacks to each branch regulating in 
the technology arena and recommends that decision-making power 
not be delegated to just one branch alone. But, since decisions 
pertaining to societal expectations are based largely in social policy, 
Part V also encourages courts applying the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test in new technological contexts to consider the legislative 
treatment of the technology in order to reach the appropriate Fourth 
Amendment balance.  
 
17. See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 430 n.12 (1990) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the Court typically utilizes a “process of 
percolation [that] allow[s] a period of exploratory consideration and 
experimentation by lower courts before the Supreme Court ends the 
process with a nationally binding rule”). 
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I. Fourth Amendment Technology Cases Before Katz 
A. The Use of Wiretapping in Olmstead v. United States 
The Court’s decision in Olmstead v. United States provides an 
appropriate starting point for discussing the Court’s pre-Katz Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.18 In Olmstead, the Court addressed 
whether warrantless wiretapping of a phone line used by suspected 
bootleggers violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the bootleggers 
who were convicted of conspiring to import, possess, and sell liquor 
unlawfully.19 The bulk of the government’s evidence was obtained by 
wiretapping the defendants’ office phone and intercepting 
conversations about the conspiracy: 
Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires 
from the residence of four of the [defendants] and those leading 
from the chief office. The insertions were made without trespass 
upon any property of the defendants.20  
In holding that the bootleggers’ Fourth Amendment rights were 
not violated by the wiretapping, the Court noted that “[t]he [Fourth] 
[A]mendment . . . shows that the search is to be of material things—
the person, the house, his papers, or his effects.”21 Since no “physical 
invasion” or seizure of “tangible material effects” occurred, the Court 
held that wiretapping did not implicate the Fourth Amendment:  
The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a 
telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project 
his voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his 
house and messages while passing over them are not within the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment. Here those who 
intercepted the projected voices were not in the house of either 
party to the conversation.22  
At this point in the Fourth Amendment’s history, the Court’s 
jurisprudence was focused almost solely on a property-based concept 
of search and seizure law:  
 
18. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
19. Id. at 455 (the Court addressed the issue of “whether the use of evidence 
of private telephone conversations between the defendants and others, 
intercepted by means of wire tapping [sic], amounted to a violation of 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments”). 
20. Id. at 456–57. 
21. Id. at 464. 
22. Id. at 466. 
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There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was 
secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There 
was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.23 
Several Justices dissented. In what is now considered a famous 
dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis criticized the Court’s narrow inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment’s language and lack of foresight 
into the implications advancing technology had for citizens’ rights.24 In 
particular, he noted that: 
[G]eneral limitations on the powers of government, like those 
embodied [in the Fourth Amendment], do not forbid the United 
States or states from meeting modern conditions by regulations 
which a century ago, or even a half century ago, probably would 
have been rejected as arbitrary or oppressive.25  
Justice Brandeis went on to observe that our Founding Fathers “knew 
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be 
found in material things” and that “[t]o protect [the Fourth 
Amendment rights of citizens], every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”26 
Though in the minority in Olmstead, the emphasis Justice Brandeis 
placed on protecting individuals’ privacy from unwarranted govern-
ment intrusion would greatly influence the Court’s later Fourth 
Amendment decisions.27  
Justice Butler echoed Justice Brandeis’s sentiments in a separate 
dissenting opinion, noting that “[t]he contacts between telephone 
 
23. Id. at 464 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 
945, 949 (2012) (observing that the Court’s “Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter 
half of the 20th century”).  
24. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A 
General Approach, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1024 (2010); see also infra 
note 27 and accompanying text (discussing several Supreme Court cases 
following Olmstead that cited Justice Brandeis’s dissent). 
25. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  
26. Id. at 478.  
27. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 959 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (citing Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent to support 
her criticism of a purely trespass-based Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983) 
(suggesting that Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent influenced the 
Court’s decision to overturn Olmstead in Katz); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643, 659 (1961) (citing Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent to support 
the Court’s application of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to 
the states). 
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companies and users contemplate the private use of the facilities 
employed in the service.”28 He also agreed that the Court failed to 
appreciate the implications advancing technology had for citizens’ 
Fourth Amendment rights:  
The direct operation or literal meaning of the words used do not 
measure the purpose or scope of its provisions. . . . [T]he Fourth 
Amendment safeguards against all evils that are like and 
equivalent to those embraced within the ordinary meaning of its 
words.29 
B. The Use of Bugging in Goldman v. United States 
Fourteen years after its ruling in Olmstead, the Court considered 
the use of a slightly different technological technique to eavesdrop on 
defendants and again declined to take a more expansive view of the 
Fourth Amendment. In Goldman v. United States, federal authorities 
had learned that the defendant was planning to commit fraud. 
Officers used a “detectaphone” to listen in on the defendant’s phone 
conversations from a room adjoining his office.30 Evidence obtained in 
this manner ultimately led to the defendant’s conviction. On appeal, 
the defendant argued that when “one talks in his own office, and 
intends his conversation to be confined within the four walls of the 
room, he does not intend his voice shall go beyond those walls and it 
is not to be assumed he takes the risk of someone’s use of a delicate 
detector in the next room.”31 The Court was not convinced, noting 
that there was no legally relevant difference between the facts of this 
case and those of Olmstead. As in Olmstead, the Court stressed that 
law enforcement officers did not trespass32 into the defendant’s office 
and that “[t]he listening in the next room to the words of [the 
defendant] as he talked into the telephone receiver was no more the 
interception of a wire communication . . . than would have been the 
overhearing of the conversation by one sitting in the same room.”33 
 
28. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 487 (Butler, J., dissenting).  
29. Id. at 488.  
30. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131 (1942). A “detectaphone” 
is essentially a large microphone held up to a wall to hear what is being 
said on the other side. 
31. Id. at 135. 
32. Federal agents did, at one point, trespass into the defendant’s office to 
install a listening device. But that device did not work and thus 
provided the government with no evidence. This trespass bore no 
influence on the Court’s ultimate holding. Id. at 131, 134–35.  
33. Id. at 134. 
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Clearly the Court was still abiding by its property-based conception 
of the Fourth Amendment.34 
Following in the footsteps of Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead 
dissent,35 Justice Murphy dissented in Goldman, pointing to the 
dangerous implications the Court’s ruling had for the privacy rights of 
citizens under the Fourth Amendment: “One of the great boons 
secured to the inhabitants of this country by the Bill of Rights is the 
right of personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”36 
Arguing that a more liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
was necessary to adequately protect citizens’ rights from advancing 
technology, Justice Murphy turned to the Founding Fathers: 
If the method and habits of the people in 1787 with respect to 
the conduct of their private business had been what they are 
today, is it possible to think that the framers of the Bill of 
Rights would have been any less solicitous of the privacy of 
transactions conducted in the office of a lawyer, a doctor, or a 
man of business, than they were of a person’s papers and 
effects?37 
Justice Murphy concluded by pointing out the narrow-mindedness 
of the Court’s holding and again emphasizing the need to protect indi-
vidual privacy: “It is a strange doctrine that keeps inviolate the most 
mundane observations entrusted to the permanence of paper but allows 
the revelation of thoughts uttered within the sanctity of private 
quarters, thoughts perhaps too intimate to be set down even in a secret 
diary . . . .”38 Justice Murphy thus pointed out how the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was failing to protect information 
that citizens intended and desired to keep private.  
 
34. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence was tied to principles of trespass until the 
latter half of the twentieth century). 
35. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (discussing Justice 
Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead).  
36. Goldman, 316 U.S. at 136 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy 
even referenced Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead, noting that he 
need add little more to the opposition of the majority’s viewpoint than 
Brandeis had already done: “On the value of the right to privacy, as 
dear as any to free men, little can or need be added to what was said 
in . . . Justice Brandeis’ memorable dissent in Olmstead v. United 
States.” Id. at 137 (citation omitted). 
37. Id. at 138–39.  
38. Id. at 141.  
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II. The Development of the Reasonable  
Expectation of Privacy Test in Katz 
Despite the Court’s adherence to Olmstead in Goldman, the 
dissatisfaction with the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
first expressed by Justices Brandeis, Butler, and Murphy began to 
take hold of other Justices. The Court began to move in a new 
direction with regard to the Fourth Amendment. As one commentator 
noted, “[w]hile the concept of ‘trespassory invasions’ and ‘intrusions 
into constitutionally protected areas’ may have made sense as applied 
to a house, a car or a briefcase, those concepts did not produce 
satisfactory results [in the face of] advancing technology.”39 And tech-
nology was not the only thing changing during the mid-twentieth 
century. Both the “legal and social climate” of the United States 
changed considerably in the decades following the Court’s Goldman 
and Olmstead rulings.40 The Supreme Court changed right along with 
them.41 Under Chief Justice Warren, the Court “[became] much more 
willing to broadly interpret constitutional protections in the light of 
changing social conditions.”42 Thus, it is not surprising that the Court 
began “heeding Brandeis’[s] call for an explicit and robust 
constitutional right to personal privacy.”43  
The Court’s change of direction was first signaled in Silverman v. 
United States.44 In Silverman, police implanted a microphone in the 
defendants’ house to eavesdrop on their conversations.45 In urging the 
suppression of evidence obtained by this microphone, the defendants 
asked the Court to reexamine its previous holdings in Olmstead and 
Goldman.46 The Court declined to do so, but only because “a fair 
reading of the record . . . show[ed] that the eavesdropping was 
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into 
 
39. Weaver, supra note 6, at 1150. 
40. Harry Henderson, Privacy in the Information Age 66 (1999). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. In the 15 years prior to its ruling in Katz, the Court ruled on Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (civil rights), Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (protection against overbroad searches), Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy), and Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (prohibiting compelled self-incrimination), each of 
which represented significant expansions of citizens’ rights under the 
Constitution. 
43. Henderson, supra note 40, at 66; see also supra notes 24–27 (discussing 
Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent).  
44. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
45. Id. at 506–07. 
46. Id. at 508. 
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the premises occupied by the [defendants].”47 This allowed the Court 
to rule in the defendants’ favor by applying its property-based view of 
the Fourth Amendment. Addressing whether Olmstead and Goldman 
were still good law was not necessary.48 Despite this, the Court hinted 
at its desire to expand Fourth Amendment protections and diverge 
from a solely property-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: 
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least 
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices 
get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches 
and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. We find no 
occasion to re-examine Goldman here, but we decline to go 
beyond it, by even a fraction of an inch.49 
It is also worth noting that the Court’s holding in Silverman 
implicitly recognized that oral communications warranted at least some 
Fourth Amendment protection. The Court had declined to extend such 
protection to oral communications in Olmstead and Goldman. 
Six years later, the Court explicitly departed from Olmstead and 
Goldman in the seminal case of Katz v. United States,50 and estab-
lished the reasonable expectation of privacy test. In Katz, the FBI 
had attached a microphone to the inside of a telephone booth that 
police knew a suspected gambler (Katz) frequently used.51 Eaves-
dropping on Katz’s phone calls confirmed the FBI’s suspicions, and 
Katz was arrested for illegal gambling activities. His case eventually 
came before the Supreme Court, which addressed whether the evidence 
discovered by eavesdropping on Katz’s telephone conversations had 
been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.52 
The Court rejected the government’s contention that Olmstead 
and Goldman supported the actions of the agents, noting that 
“property interests” no longer “control[led]” the government’s ability 
to conduct searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.53 
 
47. Id. at 509.  
48. See id. at 509–10 (“Eavesdropping accomplished by means of such a 
physical intrusion is beyond the pale of even [Olmstead and Goldman] in 
which a closely divided Court has held that eavesdropping accomplished 
by other electronic means did not amount to an invasion of Fourth 
Amendment rights.”). 
49. Id. at 512 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
50. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
51. Id. at 348. 
52. Id.  
53. Id. at 353. In the decades following Katz, many commentators (and 
perhaps even some Justices) believed that the Court’s ruling in Katz had 
done away with property law considerations in Fourth Amendment 
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Citing Silverman,54 the Court explained that “the Fourth Amendment 
governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to 
the recording of oral statements, overheard without any ‘technical 
trespass under . . . local property law.’”55 The Court also emphasized 
that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”56 It 
concluded that “the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman [had] 
been so eroded by [its] subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine 
there enunciated [could] no longer be regarded as controlling.”57 
Once the Court established that it would no longer follow Olmstead 
and Goldman, it laid the groundwork for the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test. “The Government’s activities in electronically listening 
to and recording the [defendant’s] words violated the privacy upon 
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus 
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”58 
Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment, providing further 
clarification of the Court’s holding: “My understanding of the rule 
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold 
 
jurisprudence altogether. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 
712–13 (1984) (“[A]n actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to establish a constitutional violation.”); Kerr, supra note 6, at 817 
(“Existing scholarship generally teaches that the Supreme Court 
rejected the property-based approach of Olmstead in 1967 when it 
decided Katz v. United States.”); Jerold H. Israel & Wayne R. 
LaFave, Criminal Procedure in a Nutshell 60 (5th ed., 1993) 
(“Th[e] property approach was rejected in Katz v. U.S. (1967), in favor 
of a privacy approach.”)). But the Court indicated that this was not the 
case just this past term in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
The majority, per Justice Scalia, noted that “Katz did not erode the 
principle ‘that, when the Government does engage in physical intrusion 
of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that 
intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. at 
951 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). Further, the majority observed that 
“Katz . . . established that ‘property rights are not the sole measure of 
Fourth Amendment violations,’ but did not ‘snuf[f] out the previously 
recognized protection for property.’” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 (alteration 
in original) (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992)). As 
such, a warrantless search that does not violate a citizen’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy may still violate the Fourth Amendment if the 
search involved trespass upon a constitutionally protected area, i.e., a 
person, house, paper, or effect. U.S. Const. amend. IV.  
54. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); see also supra notes 
46–52 and accompanying text (discussing Silverman). 
55. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (citing Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511).  
56. Id. at 351. 
57. Id. at 353. 
58. Id. (emphasis added). 
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requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”59  
The language set forth in Justice Harlan’s concurrence came to be 
recognized as the reasonable expectation of privacy test.60 It employs 
a two-pronged analysis for determining whether a warrantless search 
is constitutional. First, for Fourth Amendment protection to apply, 
the citizen must have a subjective expectation of privacy in the place 
or thing being searched.61 Thus, if the subject of the search does not 
actually believe the place or thing being searched is private, then his 
rights are not violated by a warrantless search of it. Indeed, for 
Fourth Amendment purposes, no search is said to have occurred at all 
if the subject does not have a subjective expectation of privacy.62  
Second, the subject’s actual expectation of privacy must be one 
that society recognizes as reasonable (i.e., an objective expectation of 
privacy).63 While this is an objective inquiry, it has never become 
totally clear how the Court answers it. Professor LaFave has 
speculated that the intended meaning of this prong may have been 
“that police investigative activity constitutes a search whenever it 
uncovers incriminating actions or objects which the law’s hypothetical 
 
59. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
60. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (noting that the Court 
“held [in Katz v. United States] that ‘the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places,’ and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable 
governmental intrusion” (emphasis added) (citations and internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); United States v. Michael, 622 F.2d 744, 750 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (making reference to “the Katz reasonable expectation of 
privacy test, as enunciated in Mr. Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion”). 
61. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.1(c) (4th ed. 
2011) (“In his oft-quoted concurring opinion in Katz, Justice Harlan 
stated the rule in terms of a ‘two fold requirement,’ the first part of 
which was ‘that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy.’”). 
62. See, e.g., id. (“There are, to be sure, a great many instances in which it 
is rather easy to say that the police made no search because the 
defendant surely did not actually expect privacy. If, for example, a 
person were openly to engage in criminal conduct in Times Square at 
high noon and this conduct were observed by a passing patrolman, it 
could hardly be seriously claimed that this observation constituted a 
Fourth Amendment search.” (emphasis added)). 
63. See id. § 2.1(d) (“In his effort to parse the holding in Katz, Justice 
Harlan declared that the second requirement was that ‘the expectation 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ This was 
apparently an attempt to give content to the word ‘justifiably’ in the 
majority’s assertion that eavesdropping on Katz was a search because it 
‘violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the 
telephone booth.’”). 
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reasonable man would expect to be private, that is, which as a matter 
of statistical probability were not likely to be discovered.”64 But the 
Court seems to have taken a slightly different approach. Justice 
Harlan noted in an opinion following Katz that this second prong 
involves a balancing test between citizens’ “sense of security” and our 
nation’s interest in effective law enforcement.65 More recently, the 
Court noted that “what is involved here is ‘our societal understanding’ 
regarding what deserves ‘protection from government invasion.’”66 
Thus, the Court seems to look primarily at two things when deter-
mining whether society is prepared to recognize an expectation of 
privacy as reasonable: (1) citizens’ privacy interests and their need to 
feel secure; and (2) the importance of maintaining efficient and 
effective law enforcement techniques.  
If the Court determines that the subject of a search did not have 
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, then no search, and 
thus no violation of the Fourth Amendment, is deemed to have 
occurred.67 
III. Fourth Amendment Technology Cases After Katz  
Since its ruling in Katz, the Supreme Court has decided a 
substantial number of Fourth Amendment cases. But surprisingly few 
deal with modern technology.68 Of those, several have come out in 
favor of the prosecution and against a defendant seeking Fourth 
Amendment protection, but such results do not demonstrate a 
deficiency in the reasonable expectation of privacy test. The Court 
decided each case in a manner consistent with its well-established aim 
of protecting citizens’ privacy through the Fourth Amendment. 
 
64. Id. 
65. Id. (quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting)). 
66. Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)). 
67. See, e.g., id. (“[I]t is possible that a person could reasonably rely on 
privacy in a given situation and, in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances, be unjustified. If two narcotics peddlers were to rely on 
the privacy of a desolate corner of Central Park in the middle of the 
night to carry out an illegal transaction, this would be a reasonable 
expectation of privacy; there would be virtually no risk of discovery. Yet 
if by extraordinary good luck a patrolman were to illuminate the 
desolate spot with his flashlight, the criminals would be unable to 
suppress the officer’s testimony as a violation of their rights under the 
fourth amendment.” (quoting Note, From Private Places to Personal 
Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection, 43 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 968, 983 (1968))). 
68. See infra Parts III.A–E (noting that the Court has ruled on 
approximately eight Fourth Amendment cases involving modern 
technology since its ruling in Katz).  
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Accordingly, these cases do not indicate that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test developed in Katz is unable to protect 
citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights from modern technology.  
A. Wired Informants and Pen Registers 
The Court’s first Fourth Amendment technology case after Katz 
was United States v. White.69 In White, the Court addressed the ad-
missibility of several conversations defendant White had with an 
undercover government agent. The undercover agent had a concealed 
radio transmitter on his person and transmitted the conversations to 
other federal agents who recorded them.70 The Supreme Court held 
that the admission of these conversations at White’s trial did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment, noting that Katz in no way indicated 
that “a defendant has a justifiable and constitutionally protected 
expectation that a person with whom he is conversing will not then or 
later reveal the conversation to the police.”71  
The principle that disclosure to third parties limits the reason-
ableness of an expectation of privacy in the disclosed information was 
well-established precedent by the time of the Court’s decision in 
White.72 But even without such precedent, the decision was in 
consonance with both Katz and common sense. The Court noted in 
Katz that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”73 With this language in mind, it was consistent with past 
jurisprudence for the Court in White to hold that “one contemplating 
illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be 
reporting to the police.”74 This rule makes sense on a very basic level: 
once an individual converses with another, he can no longer 
reasonably expect the shared information to remain private because 
 
69. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion).  
70. Id. at 746–47. 
71. Id. at 749. 
72. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (when a defendant 
discloses information to a third party, “no interest legitimately 
protected by the Fourth Amendment is involved . . . [because the] 
Fourth Amendment [does not] protect[ ] a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief 
that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not 
reveal it”); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); see also Yale 
Kamisar, Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold Israel, Nancy J. King & 
Orin S. Kerr, Basic Criminal Procedure 474 (13th ed. 2012) 
(“The Hoffa case was decided one year before Katz v. United 
States . . . and it therefore predates the ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ test first articulated in Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence.”). 
73. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
74. White, 401 U.S. at 752. 
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he cannot prevent his listener from divulging the information.75 This 
principle, known as “third-party doctrine,” plays a significant role in 
the Court’s Fourth Amendment and technology jurisprudence.76 
The Court next addressed the Fourth Amendment in a 
technological context eight years later in Smith v. Maryland.77 This 
case provides an apt example of third-party doctrine in the Fourth 
Amendment context. The victim had been robbed by a man who 
drove a 1975 Monte Carlo automobile.78 After the robbery, the victim 
received threatening phone calls from an individual purporting to be 
the robber. During one of these calls, the man told the victim to look 
outside. The victim saw a 1975 Monte Carlo parked outside her home. 
Several days later, police saw the defendant driving a 1975 Monte 
Carlo in the vicinity of the victim’s house. Without first obtaining a 
warrant, the police had the telephone company install a pen register 
on the phone line of the car’s registered owner (the defendant) in 
order to record the numbers dialed from his home phone. Using the 
information obtained from the pen register, the police determined that 
the defendant had indeed been placing the harassing phone calls. He 
was subsequently arrested and convicted of both the robbery and 
harassment.79 
The Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the pen register 
evidence. First, the Court noted that the defendant likely did not 
have even a subjective expectation of privacy because telephone users 
realize that they must convey “numerical information to the phone 
company . . . for a variety of legitimate business purposes,” including 
long-distance billing, billing for special call plans, and preventing 
“unwelcome and troublesome calls.”80 Moreover, regardless of the 
defendant’s subjective expectations, the Court held that he did not 
have an expectation of privacy that “society is prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’”81 The Court noted that it “consistently has held that 
 
75. See id. at 751 (“[I]ndividual defendants neither know nor suspect that 
their colleagues have gone or will go to the police . . . .”). 
76. See, e.g., Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth 
Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 39, 39 
(2011) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine . . . holds that 
a person retains no expectation of privacy in information conveyed to 
another.”); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) 
(defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in drugs he placed 
in friend’s purse because he had conveyed the drugs to a third party).  
77. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
78. Id. at 737. 
79. Id. at 737–38. 
80. Id. at 742–43. 
81. Id. at 743 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)).  
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a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”82 
While at first glance this may seem to restrict the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, the Court was careful to qualify its 
holding in terms of the very “limited” information pen registers 
record: “Neither the purport of any communication between the caller 
and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was 
even completed is disclosed by pen registers.”83 As such, the Court 
was careful to consider the importance of citizens’ privacy before 
handing down its decision. In light of this qualification, it is doubtful 
that the Court would have upheld the use of the pen register under 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test if it had revealed any 
substance of the phone calls. Indeed, such warrantless eavesdropping 
was held unconstitutional in Katz. This holding is also faithful to the 
third-party doctrine rationale found in White. Smith could not have 
reasonably expected the phone numbers he dialed to remain private 
because a reasonable person understands that such information is con-
veyed to a third party.  
B. The Beeper Cases 
Two of the Court’s most significant post-Katz Fourth Amendment 
and technology decisions occurred just a few years after Smith. The 
first case, United States v. Knotts,84 involved the use of a “beeper” to 
track a defendant’s car.85 When federal authorities learned of an 
individual purchasing large amounts of chemicals typically used to 
manufacture methamphetamines, they installed a beeper inside a five-
gallon container of chloroform, which was subsequently sold to the 
defendant.86 Through a combination of visual surveillance and 
tracking information transmitted by the beeper, officers tracked the 
defendant’s car to a cabin in a remote part of Minnesota. No 
information from the beeper was used after the location of the cabin 
was determined.87 Police subsequently discovered that the defendant 
 
82. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 
752 (1971) (plurality opinion), Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 
(1966), and several other Supreme Court decisions). 
83. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741–42.  
84. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  
85. The “beeper” utilized by law enforcement in this case was a sort of 
tracking device. See id. at 277 (“A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually 
battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by 
a radio receiver.”).  
86. Police received permission from the chemical company before installing 
the beeper in the container of chloroform. Id. at 278. 
87. Id. at 278–79. 
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had a drug lab and fourteen pounds of pure amphetamine in the 
cabin. The defendant was arrested and convicted on drug charges.88  
The Supreme Court held that the surveillance information 
provided by the beeper did not violate the Fourth Amendment.89 The 
Court’s holding was based primarily on its conclusion that citizens do 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements 
when driving in an automobile: 
A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from 
one place to another. When [the defendant] travelled over the 
public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to 
look the fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a 
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the 
fact of his final destination when he exited from public roads 
onto private property.90  
As in Smith, the Court was careful to qualify its holding, noting that 
“there [was] no indication that the beeper was used in any way to 
reveal information as to the movement of the [chemicals] within the 
cabin, or in any way that would not have been visible to the naked 
eye from outside the cabin.”91 Thus, the Court applied third-party 
doctrine in a manner similar to that in White and Smith, but was 
careful to note that its holding may well have been different if the 
beeper had revealed information not already made available to the 
general public. 
The following year, in United States v. Karo,92 the Court 
demonstrated the limits of its holding in Knotts. The facts of Karo 
were remarkably similar to those of Knotts. Federal agents learned 
that the defendant was buying large amounts of ether, a chemical 
used to extract cocaine from clothing.93 After obtaining the chemical 
seller’s consent, agents replaced one of the barrels in the defendant’s 
upcoming order with a barrel containing a hidden beeper.94 Agents 
observed the defendant pick up the barrels and used the beeper to 
track them back to the defendant’s house. At this point, the facts 
began to differ from those of Knotts. Over the next several months, 
 
88. Id. at 279. 
89. As it was not an issue raised on appeal, the Court did not address 
whether the initial installation of the beeper violated the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 279 n.*. 
90. Id. at 281–82. 
91. Id. at 285. 
92. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
93. Id. at 708. 
94. Id. 
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agents continued to use the beeper, determining that the ether was 
moved to three other houses and two different storage facilities.95 Five 
months after the defendant first picked up the barrel, agents tracked 
it, still using the signals transmitted by the beeper, to a house rented 
by the defendant.96 The following day, agents used the beeper to 
determine that the barrel was still on the premises and also noted 
that the house’s windows were open despite it being a very cold day.97 
Based on this information, agents acquired a search warrant and 
discovered a cocaine laboratory in the house. The defendant was 
arrested and convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine.98  
The Supreme Court overturned the defendant’s conviction. 
Distinguishing Knotts, the Court noted that the beeper in Karo “was 
used to locate the ether in a specific house.”99 In comparison, the 
beeper in Knotts had been used only to track a car to a specific 
location, using information that was “‘voluntarily conveyed to anyone 
who wanted to look.’”100 Since the beeper in Karo was used to “reveal 
a critical fact about the interior of the premises . . . that [the Govern-
ment] could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant,”101 the 
Court held that the police had infringed upon the defendant’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy within his residence:  
[P]rivate residences are places in which the individual normally 
expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized 
by a warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is 
prepared to recognize as justifiable . . . . Indiscriminate monitor-
ing of property that has been withdrawn from public view 
would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the 
home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment 
oversight.102 
As such, the Court demonstrated the limit of third-party doctrine. 
The beeper tracking in Karo went beyond simply helping the police 
discover information that was already being conveyed to the public. It 
helped them discover information that they could not have otherwise 
discovered without encroaching upon the defendant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his house. While citizens oftentimes cannot 
 
95. Id. at 708–10. 
96. Id. at 709. 
97. Id. at 710. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 714. 
100. Id. at 715 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)). 
101. Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. 
102. Id. at 714, 716. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century 
206 
reasonably expect to keep private that which they expose to the 
public, the Court recognized that it is most certainly reasonable to 
expect privacy for that which goes on behind closed doors in a home. 
C. Aerial Surveillance 
In 1986, the Court ruled on two Fourth Amendment cases 
involving aerial surveillance. The first, California v. Ciraolo,103 
involved a defendant who grew large quantities of marijuana in his 
backyard. Since the defendant’s yard was surrounded by a ten-foot-
high fence, police flew a plane over his house and took pictures of his 
marijuana crop.104 The police used these pictures to obtain an arrest 
warrant and, after failing to get the pictures suppressed, the 
defendant pled guilty to the cultivation of marijuana.105 
The Supreme Court held that the aerial surveillance did not 
violate the defendant’s rights. While acknowledging that the 
“curtilage” of one’s property is generally protected under the Fourth 
Amendment,106 the Court made clear that “[t]he Fourth Amendment 
protection of the home has never been extended to require law 
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on 
public thoroughfares.”107 As such, the Court held that the defendant’s 
“expectation that his garden was protected from . . . observation was 
unreasonable” because “[a]ny member of the public flying in [the] 
airspace [above the defendant’s yard] . . . could have seen everything 
that these officers observed.”108 Such reasoning may initially seem to 
stretch the bounds of third-party doctrine—indeed, what are the 
chances a member of the general public would fly over the defendant’s 
house and identify as marijuana the plants growing in his backyard?109 
 
103. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986). 
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 209–10. 
106. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) 
(“[C]urtilage . . . warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that 
attach to the home. At common law, the curtilage is the area to which 
extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a man’s 
home and the privacies of life, and therefore has been considered part of 
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
107. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213. 
108. Id. at 213–14. 
109. See id. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The only possible basis for [the 
Court’s holding] is a judgment that the risk to privacy posed by the 
remote possibility that a private airplane passenger will notice outdoor 
activities is equivalent to the risk of official aerial surveillance 
. . . . Members of the public use the airspace for travel, business, or 
pleasure, not for the purpose of observing activities taking place within 
residential yards.”). 
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But the Court further clarified the unreasonableness of the 
defendant’s expectation of privacy in this case, noting that even a 
“power company repair mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard” 
could have seen the marijuana.110 Presumably, one of the defendant’s 
neighbors could also have seen over the fence by looking out a second-
story window into the backyard.  
In fact, a neighbor looking into Ciraolo’s yard may have been 
precisely what happened. The officer in charge of the search had over 
eight years of experience dealing with and identifying marijuana 
gardens and had received an anonymous phone call in which the caller 
stated he could see marijuana in Ciraolo’s backyard.111 That officer 
also received “ten to twelve” other tips about marijuana gardens in 
the same general area as Ciraolo’s house, and during the aerial 
surveillance at issue in the case the officer identified five other 
marijuana gardens in addition to Ciraolo’s.112 The Court’s opinion in-
explicably omitted these facts, based on which it appears that the 
flight was not undertaken solely to peer into a single citizen’s 
backyard, but rather as a part of a larger-scale investigation.  
Viewed in light of these facts, the Court’s holding in Ciraolo is 
not surprising. When one conducts illegal activities in his backyard 
with nothing more than a fence separating him from the public eye, it 
is unreasonable to believe that the activities will go undetected by 
individuals outside the property. Further, evidence of Ciraolo’s 
criminal activity was obtained during a sweep of an entire area—an 
area that police arguably had at least reasonable suspicion, and 
perhaps even probable cause, to believe was a hotbed of drug-related 
activity.  
On the same day it decided Ciraolo, the Court also handed down 
its decision in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,113 a case with largely 
parallel facts. After the Dow Chemical Company refused to admit 
EPA inspectors into its factory, the EPA employed a professional 
aerial photographer to fly over the plant and take pictures of it.114 
The EPA did not inform Dow Chemical of this surveillance, and when 
Dow found out it filed suit against the EPA, alleging (among other 
things) a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court 
held that no such violation had taken place and rejected Dow 
Chemical’s argument that the outdoor areas surrounding its enclosed 
 
110. Id. at 215 (majority opinion). 
111. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 6–8, California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986) (No. 84-1513) (Aug. 8, 1985). 
112. Id. at 8. The impressive size of the marijuana crop is revealed in the 
petitioner’s brief: “Seventy three cultivated marijuana plants, averaging 
eight feet tall, were seized from [Ciraolo’s] back yard.” Id. at 10.  
113. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
114. Id. at 229.  
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buildings were “industrial curtilage.”115 The Court noted that these 
areas were more akin to “open fields” than curtilage and thus were 
not protected by the Fourth Amendment: “The intimate activities 
associated with family privacy and the home and its curtilage simply 
do not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and 
buildings of a manufacturing plant . . . . [W]hat is observable by the 
public is observable without a warrant, by the Government inspector 
as well.”116 
While the Court could have ended its decision there, it went on to 
clarify the narrowness of its holding. It emphasized that the inner 
areas of Dow Chemical’s plant were clearly protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, but noted that the owner of commercial property cannot 
expect the same level of privacy as a homeowner in his dwelling since 
commercial properties, unlike homes, are not “free from any 
inspections.”117 The Court also suggested that the use of highly 
advanced technology to conduct searches “might be constitutionally 
proscribed absent a warrant.”118 Its holding may have been different 
had the camera used in the case been able to reveal intimate details 
like a “class ring” or “identifiable human faces.”119 Such circumstances 
would have “implicate[d] more serious privacy concerns.”120 
D. Infrared Imaging 
In 2001, the Court ruled on Kyllo v. United States.121 Federal 
agents received a tip that the defendant grew marijuana in his home. 
Since such indoor cultivation typically entails the use of high-intensity 
lamps, police used a thermal imager to determine whether high levels 
of heat were emanating from the defendant’s house.122 The scans 
revealed that parts of the house were significantly warmer than the 
surrounding homes. This evidence helped the police obtain a search 
warrant and ultimately discover the defendant’s marijuana plants. 
After unsuccessfully moving to suppress the thermal imaging 
evidence, the defendant conditionally pled guilty to manufacturing 
marijuana.123 
 
115. Id. at 235. 
116. Id. at 236, 238 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
117. Id. at 238.  
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 238, n.5. 
120. Id. 
121. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
122. Id. at 29–30. 
123. Id. at 30. 
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The Court held that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 
had been violated by the admission of the thermal imaging evidence. 
It began by emphasizing that “[w]ith few exceptions, the question 
whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence 
constitutional must be answered no.”124 After recognizing the dangers 
modern technology poses to the privacy of citizens,125 the Court went 
on to hold that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area constitutes a search.”126  
The Court made the need to ensure that citizens’ rights are 
adequately protected from advancing technology abundantly clear in 
its decision. It pointed out the dangers posed to privacy rights by 
devices like “thermal imager[s],” “powerful directional microphone[s],” 
and “satellite[s]” and stated that “the rule we adopt must take 
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development.”127 The Court explicitly rejected the suggestion of 
limiting the Fourth Amendment to prohibiting only those practices 
that reveal “intimate details” of the household.128 The Court observed 
that “[i]n the home . . . all details are intimate details, because the 
entire area is held safe from prying government eyes” and that “the 
Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house.”129 
The Court could not have made clearer its dedication to protecting 
the privacy of the home. 
E. GPS Surveillance: United States v. Jones 
This past term, the Court handed down its most recent Fourth 
Amendment and technology decision, United States v. Jones.130 Jones 
was suspected of trafficking drugs. Without a warrant,131 police 
attached a GPS tracking device to the underside of his car and 
tracked its movements for twenty-eight days, generating over 2,000 
pages of data.132 The government eventually used this information to 
 
124. Id. at 31. 
125. See id. at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of 
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely 
unaffected by the advance of technology.”).  
126. Id. at 34 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
127. Id. at 35–36. 
128. Id. at 37–38. 
129. Id. at 37, 40 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
130. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
131. The police actually did obtain a warrant at one point, but it expired 
prior to their installation of the GPS device on Jones’s car. Id. at 948. 
132. Id. 
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charge Jones with multiple counts of conspiracy to possess and 
distribute cocaine.133 Jones unsuccessfully moved the district court to 
suppress the GPS evidence and was ultimately convicted on the drug 
charges.134 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed Jones’s conviction and suppressed the GPS 
evidence, noting that “[a] reasonable person does not expect anyone to 
monitor and retain a record of every time he drives his 
car . . . [because] prolonged GPS monitoring defeats an expectation of 
privacy that our society recognizes as reasonable.”135 
The Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, affirmed the Court of 
Appeals’ result, but on different grounds. Since the government 
“physically occupied” a Fourth Amendment “effect” without first 
obtaining a warrant, the Court held that it did not even need to 
pursue a Katz reasonable expectation of privacy analysis to conclude 
that Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.136 
Protecting “effects” from unwarranted government intrusions was a 
function of the Fourth Amendment even before the adoption of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test. The Court admonished that 
“Katz did not repudiate [this] understanding” and “did not erode the 
principle ‘that, when the Government does engage in physical intrusion 
of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that 
intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.’”137 
The Court made clear that its ruling in Katz was an expansion of 
Fourth Amendment protections138 and “added to, not substituted for, 
the common-law trespassory test.”139 Thus, the Court held that when 
the government intrudes upon an area explicitly protected by the 
Fourth Amendment for the purpose of obtaining information, that 
action is a prima facie unconstitutional search if done without a 
warrant. Katz analysis is not even necessary to protect such a basic 
Fourth Amendment guarantee. 
 
133. Id. at 948–49. 
134. Id. at 949. 
135. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d 
on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012). 
136. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–52. 
137. Id. at 950–51 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
138. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 (“Katz did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s 
scope.”); see also id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“In Katz, [the] 
Court enlarged its then-prevailing focus on property rights by announcing 
that the reach of the Fourth Amendment does not ‘turn upon the 
presence or absence of a physical intrusion.’” (emphasis added)).  
139. Id. at 952 (majority opinion).  
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Though not necessary to its holding, the Court also included some 
discussion about the reasonable expectation of privacy test and the 
need to protect citizens’ privacy interests. The Court noted that 
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals 
without trespass remain subject to Katz analysis.”140 The majority 
reaffirmed the Court’s dedication to protecting privacy interests, 
stating that “[a]t bottom, [the Court] must ‘assur[e] preservation of 
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted.’”141 A search similar to the one in 
Jones, but achieved “without an accompanying trespass, [may be] an 
unconstitutional invasion of privacy.”142 “Katz analysis” would be 
used to answer such a question should it arise.143 This language makes 
clear that the Court intends to continue utilizing the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test in future Fourth Amendment and 
technology cases. 
An intriguing duo of concurrences further demonstrates the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test’s continued vitality in the 
technology context. Justice Sotomayor joined the majority’s opinion 
because the government’s intrusion upon a constitutionally protected 
area allowed for resolution of this case on a “narrow[ ] basis.”144 She 
recognized the trespassory test espoused by the majority as an 
“irreducible constitutional minimum.”145 But she also wrote separately 
to acknowledge the potential threats posed to the Fourth Amendment 
by GPS technology. She noted that, since “physical intrusion is now 
unnecessary to many forms of surveillance,” the Court will have to 
rely largely on Katz analysis in future Fourth Amendment cases.146 
Justice Sotomayor went on to argue that it would be important to 
account for the “substantial quantum of intimate information” 
revealed by advanced surveillance technologies like GPS when 
applying the Katz test in future cases: “I would ask whether people 
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and 
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, 
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, 
and so on.”147 To support this argument, she pointed out that the 
 
140. Id. at 953. 
141. Id. at 950 (emphasis added) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 
27, 34 (2001)). 
142. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
145. Id. at 955. 
146. Id.  
147. Id. at 956. 
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Court left open in Kyllo the possibility that “duplicating traditional 
surveillance ‘through electronic means, without an accompanying 
trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.’”148 Thus, it 
appears Justice Sotomayor is prepared to hold in future cases that 
unwarranted GPS surveillance infringes upon citizens’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy. 
Justice Alito wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. He seemed largely to agree 
with Justice Sotomayor’s view, arguing that long-term “GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations 
of privacy.”149 He noted that “[f]or such offenses, society’s expectation 
has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and 
indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue 
every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long 
period.”150 Therefore, at least as far as long-term GPS surveillance is 
concerned, Justice Alito, along with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan, would hold that such an investigative technique fails Katz 
analysis and thus violates the Fourth Amendment.151 
The disjoint between Justices Alito and Sotomayor resulted from 
Justice Alito’s argument that “relatively short-term [GPS] monitoring 
of a person’s movements on public streets” does not violate a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.152 He also does not buy into the 
trespassory test espoused by the majority.153 In contrast, Justice 
Sotomayor agrees with the majority holding, noting that “Justice 
Alito’s approach, which discounts altogether the constitutional 
relevance of the Government’s physical intrusion on Jones’ Jeep, 
erodes that longstanding protection for privacy inherent in items of 
property that people possess or control.”154 She also seems to believe 
that, due to the invasive nature of GPS surveillance, all such 
surveillance implicates a reasonable expectation of privacy.155  
 
148. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 n.2 (2001)). 
149. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
150. Id. 
151. Justice Alito did not make clear what his definition of “long-term” is. 
See id. (“We need not identify with precision the point at which the 
tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed 
before the 4 week mark.”); see also id. at 954 (majority opinion) (“[I]t 
remains unexplained why a 4 week investigation is ‘surely’ too long.”). 
152. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); see also infra notes 276–82 and 
accompanying text (discussing the concurring opinions in Jones). 
153. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring). 
154. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
155. Id.  
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There are two key points to take away from Jones. First, in a 
case involving by far the most advanced surveillance technology the 
Court has dealt with, all nine justices voted to protect citizens’ 
Fourth Amendment rights. Second, and perhaps more importantly for 
the purposes of this Note, five justices also indicated that, at least as 
far as long-term GPS surveillance is concerned, they are prepared to 
apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test in a manner that 
recognizes society’s reasonable expectation that it will not be 
continuously monitored by GPS technology. This apparent willingness 
strongly indicates that the reasonable expectation of privacy test can 
be applied in a way that protects citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights 
from the advance of modern technology. 
IV. Katz Lives 
Academic reception of Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
test has been lackluster at best. One commentator, although 
characterizing the holding of Katz as “revolutionary,” argues that “the 
passage of time . . . [has] show[n] that Katz . . . [has done] little to 
protect Fourth Amendment liberties.”156 Other commentators have 
criticized Katz for being ambiguous and failing to provide adequate 
guidance as to how the reasonable expectation of privacy test ought 
to be applied.157 With regard to the Fourth Amendment and modern 
technologies, commentators have argued that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test in its current state is insufficient to protect 
citizens from warrantless e-mail searches158 and video surveillance.159 
 
156. Maclin, supra note 7, at 56; see also Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You 
Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Privacy, False Friends, and the Perils of 
Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 
39 Ind. L. Rev. 253, 255 (2006) (“The Court needs to reconsider how 
expectations of privacy really work.”); Kerr, supra note 6, at 807 (arguing 
that the reasonable expectation of privacy test “has proven more a 
revolution on paper than in practice”). 
157. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution 
of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks 
Image and Identity, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1349, 1366 (2004) (“[Katz’s] 
ambiguity blurs the clear lines people often depend on to figure out 
where and when they are free from monitoring and leads courts to 
confuse situations where privacy interests are absent with very different 
situations where privacy interests must share space with other 
important public interests, but deserve vigorous protection at the same 
time.”); James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the 
Fourth Amendment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 Miss. L.J. 317, 340 
(2002) (“bemoan[ing] the serious deficiencies in the guidance provided 
by the Katz opinion” and arguing that “[t]he Court provided little, if 
any, insight concerning [the] critical issue[ ]” of what privacy interests 
are actually protected by the Constitution).  
158. See Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A 
Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 
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Several commentators have even proposed doing away with the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test all together.160 Some of the 
initial reaction to United States v. Jones seems to suggest that many 
of these commentators won’t be changing their minds anytime soon.161  
Despite such negative commentary, significant evidence indicates 
that the reasonable expectation of privacy test has more than 
 
Mercer L. Rev. 507, 522 (2005) (“[M]ost courts have yet to determine 
whether the sender of e-mail retains a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the contents of the message. An examination of how the [reasonable 
expectation of privacy] doctrine applies to e-mail demonstrates an 
ambiguity in the third party doctrine that has significant ramifications 
for technologically-enhanced searches.”); Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” 
of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy Would Change 
Computer Crime Law, 54 Hastings L.J. 805, 814 (2003) (“[T]he answer 
to the question of how much privacy protection the Fourth Amendment 
guarantees to Internet communications appears to be ‘not much.’ And 
certainly not enough.”); Ryan A. Ray, The Warrantless Interception of 
E-Mail: Fourth Amendment Search or Free Rein for the Police?, 36 
Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 178, 181 (2010) (“It seems that 
most, if not all, e-mail users expect that their e-mail will remain private, 
at least until the messages reach the intended recipient . . . . Yet many 
courts have refused to recognize e-mail users’ expectations of privacy.”). 
159. Blitz, supra note 157. See also Casey, supra note 8, at 977 (“The 
application of the Katz standard . . . has generated anomalous results, 
and the deficiencies of the Katz test are particularly apparent in the 
context of the government’s use of new technologies to conduct 
electronic surveillance.”).  
160. See Casey, supra note 8, at 1026 (“The reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard should be abandoned in favor of a test that reclaims 
the original language of the Fourth Amendment—the right to be secure. 
Removing the reasonable expectation of privacy from our Fourth 
Amendment discourse will resolve some of the confusion that has 
plagued jurisprudence in the post-Katz era.”); Henderson, supra note 
158, at 546 (arguing in favor of “jettisoning the [reasonable expectation 
of privacy] test in favor of a dictionary definition of search”); Kerr, 
supra note 6, at 807 (arguing that courts “have rejected broad claims to 
privacy in developing technologies with surprising consistency” and 
urging that courts should take a backseat to the legislature in making 
Fourth Amendment decisions dealing with technology); Steven Penney, 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: An 
Economic Approach, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 477, 506 (2007) 
(arguing that the reasonable expectation of privacy test should be 
replaced with an “economically-informed cost-benefit analysis”); see also 
Kerr, supra note 24 (proposing a new test for dealing with searches of e-
mail). 
161. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Op-Ed., Privacy, Technology, and Law, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 29, 2012, at SR5 (“Jones, along with other recent decisions, 
may turn the Fourth Amendment into a ticking time bomb, set to self-
destruct—and soon—in the face of rapidly emerging technology.”); see 
also infra Part IV.B.4 (discussing the impact of Jones on Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence). 
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adequately protected citizens’ privacy interests in the past and that it 
will continue to do so—even in the face of advancing technology. The 
Supreme Court’s own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence supports this 
proposition.162 Further, lower courts have dealt with several types of 
modern technology that the Supreme Court has yet to pass judgment 
on and have utilized the reasonable expectation of privacy test to 
protect the privacy interests of citizens.163 As such, recommendations 
that the Court abandon Katz and the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test in the face of advancing technology would seem at the 
very least premature, and, as shown below, completely unnecessary.  
A. A Lack of “Modern” Technology Fourth Amendment Cases 
Before analyzing the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, it is important to point out that the Court has ruled 
on an extremely small number of Fourth Amendment cases dealing 
with modern technology. Before the Court’s ruling in Jones164 this 
past term, Kyllo was the Court’s only Fourth Amendment case 
substantively involving some sort of modern technology in the past 
twenty years.165 Many rapidly advancing technologies with serious 
Fourth Amendment implications, such as video surveillance,166 have 
yet to come before the Court in any Fourth Amendment context. 
Perhaps most notably, and despite extensive academic condemnation 
of the reasonable expectation of privacy test in the realm of the 
Internet,167 the Court has never ruled on a Fourth Amendment case 
dealing with a search of information on the Internet.  
 
162. See infra Part IV.B (demonstrating how the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence indicates that the reasonable expectation of 
privacy is capable of protecting citizens’ privacy interests). 
163. See infra Part IV.C (discussing lower courts’ application of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
164. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also supra Part III.E 
(discussing the holding of, and concurring opinions in, Jones). 
165. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the warrantless 
use of infrared technology to detect heat emanating from defendant’s 
townhouse violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
and thus was an impermissible search under the Fourth Amendment); 
see supra Part III.D (discussing the holding of Kyllo). In 2010, the 
Court dealt with a case involving text messaging and the Fourth 
Amendment. But the Court sidestepped the technological issue entirely 
by deciding the case under already established principles of Fourth 
Amendment and employment law. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. 
Ct. 2619 (2010). That the Court opted to do so is yet another instance 
of the Justices approaching modern technology in the Fourth 
Amendment context with caution. 
166. See infra Part IV.C.1. 
167. Kerr, supra note 6; Kerr, supra note 24; Maclin, supra note 7; see also 
Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 904, 
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From these considerations alone, this Note urges patience on the 
part of Fourth Amendment commentators. It is no secret that the 
Court prefers to let issues percolate in the district and circuit courts 
before definitively ruling on them168 and often feels bound by judicial 
restraint to rule only on matters immediately before it.169 The Court 
has been particularly inclined toward this practice in the law and 
technology context.170 For this reason, it is as of yet unclear how the 
Court will apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test to many of 
the new technologies of the past twenty years, meaning that the call 
for Katz’s demise has been, at the very least, premature. In the 
meantime, commentators concerned about poorly reasoned lower 
court opinions unduly influencing the Supreme Court should take 
solace in the fact that in Kyllo the Court granted a criminal suspect 
“a protection previously rejected by five federal courts of appeals and 
 
904 (2004) (“[T]he demise of Katz has actually been 
understated. . . . [C]ases . . . hold that many kinds of surveillance are 
not ‘searches’ under the Fourth Amendment.”); Matthew D. Lawless, 
Comment, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records 
and the Case for a “Crazy Quilt” of Fourth Amendment Protection, 11 
UCLA J.L. & Tech., no. 1, Spring 2007, at 1, available at http:// 
www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2007/02_070426_lawless.pdf (“[T]he 
only bar to [Internet search] records becoming Exhibits A-Z [in a 
criminal proceeding] is a Fourth Amendment that, while purporting to 
protect expectations of privacy society would deem reasonable, utterly 
fails to consider what society has said about Internet searches.”). 
168. See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 430–31 n.12 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court typically utilizes a 
“process of percolation [that] allow[s] a period of exploratory 
consideration and experimentation by lower courts before the Supreme 
Court ends the process with a nationally binding rule” (quoting Samuel 
Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 681, 
716 (1984))). 
169. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Considerations of propriety, as well as long-
established practice, demand that [the Court] refrain from passing upon 
the constitutionality of an [issue] unless obliged to do so in the proper 
performance of our judicial function, when the question is raised by a 
party whose interests entitle him to raise it.” (quoting Blair v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919))). 
170. See, e.g., Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629 (“The judiciary risks error by 
elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of 
emerging technology before its role in society has become clear. . . . 
Prudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant case are used 
to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and extent, 
of privacy expectations enjoyed by employees when using employer-
provided communication devices.”). 
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adopted by none.”171 Further, substantial evidence in the jurisprudence 
of both the Supreme Court and the lower courts suggests the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test provides a more than satisfactory 
framework for protecting citizens’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights in 
the face of advancing technology.  
B. Katz and the Protection of Citizens’ Privacy 
1. Unwavering Protection of the Home 
Ample language exists in the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment decisions to suggest that, as the Court begins to hear 
more Fourth Amendment cases dealing with modern technology, it 
will apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test in a manner that 
protects citizens’ privacy. First and foremost, the Court has always 
been steadfast in its protection of privacy in the home—an area in 
which all citizens undoubtedly expect the utmost level of privacy. As 
early as 1886, the Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
“appl[ies] to all invasions on the part of the government and its 
employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”172 
The Court has never wavered from this principle. In Karo, the Court 
recognized as a “basic Fourth Amendment principle” that “private 
residences are places in which the individual normally expects privacy 
free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant.”173 In 
language undoubtedly referencing Katz’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy test, the Court noted that this “expectation is plainly one 
that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable.”174 With this 
language in hand, the Court went on to hold in Karo that beeper 
tracking technology could not be used without a warrant to “reveal a 
critical fact about the interior of [a house] that the Government is 
extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise 
obtained without a warrant.”175  
More recently, the Court dealt with infrared technology in 
Kyllo.176 Staying true to its emphasis on protecting the privacy of the 
home, the Court, per Justice Scalia,177 noted that “‘[a]t the very core’ 
 
171. David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 
72 Miss. L.J. 143, 144 n.5 (2002) (citing multiple circuit court cases 
holding that the use of warrantless thermal imaging did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment).  
172. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).  
173. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). 
174. Id.  
175. Id. at 715. 
176. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
177. The fact that Justice Scalia penned the majority opinion in Kyllo should 
not be overlooked. Prior to the Kyllo decision, Justice Scalia had been 
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of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into 
his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.’”178 The Court went on to cite the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test, stating that  
the Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance of 
the house . . . . In the case of the search of the interior of 
homes . . . there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the 
common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that 
exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.179  
The Court ultimately held that the warrantless use of infrared 
technology to detect temperature levels in the defendant’s house was 
contrary to the Fourth Amendment. All details of the home’s interior, 
the Court noted, are protected “from prying government eyes” under 
the Fourth Amendment.180 The Court used Kyllo to draw “a firm line 
at the entrance of the house” to ensure that law enforcement cannot 
use advanced technology to intrude upon the most private of all 
places—the home.181 
The language and holdings of cases like Karo and Kyllo make 
abundantly clear that the Court has successfully used the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test to defend citizens’ privacy interests in 
their homes from invasive modern technologies. This is of the utmost 
importance. Throughout this nation’s history, and indeed even well 
 
one of the reasonable expectation of privacy test’s most outspoken 
critics. For instance, just a few years prior he had characterized the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test as “self-indulgent” and lacking 
“plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment.” Minnesota 
v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998). While the test did not completely 
escape criticism in his majority opinion (he noted that the test has 
“often been criticized as circular,” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34), Justice Scalia 
clearly applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test in holding that 
the government’s warrantless use of thermal imaging violated the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy as to the intimate details 
of his home. See also Tomkovicz, supra note 157, at 343 n.126 
(discussing Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Minnesota v. Carter).  
178. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
511 (1961)). 
179. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 40 (emphasis added) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
180. Id. at 37. Justice Breyer was particularly concerned about protecting the 
interior of the home from prying eyes. At the oral argument for Kyllo, 
he quipped: “I usually spend three or four hours a day in my Finnish 
sauna. People think I’m working. I don’t want them to find out what’s 
going on.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99–8508), available at http://www.supreme 
court.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/99-8508.pdf. 
181. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
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before it,182 the home has been considered a “sacred” place, “a 
haven from the anxieties of modern life . . . [that provides] a shelter 
for . . . moral and spiritual values.”183 The importance of having a 
home that one can retreat to for privacy has been recognized by 
virtually all facets of American culture; everything from books184 and 
movies185 to zoning186 and tort law187 place high value on the home as 
 
182. See, e.g., John M. Roberts & Thomas Gregor, Privacy: A Cultural View, 
in Privacy 199–200, 203 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 
1971) (“[T]he household is truly a cultural universal. . . . Societies differ in 
many ways, but they always have households of one sort or 
another. . . . It would appear that privacy, as we know it, is largely a 
neolithic invention occurring primarily in the Old World and associated 
with the Near Eastern cultural complex which later diffused to all the 
centers of high culture in the Old World.”). The late law professor and 
former chief counsel for the U.S. Senate Watergate Committee, Samuel 
Dash, explored the legal history of privacy in his book The Intruders. 
Samuel Dash, The Intruders: Unreasonable Searches and 
Seizures from King John to John Ashcroft (2004). In the book’s 
introduction, Professor Dash pointed to several famous men throughout 
history whose words demonstrate the long-cherished history of the home 
as a haven, including William Pitt, Hammurabi, and Cicero. Id. at 1, 9. 
William Pitt offered the famous refrain: 
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the 
forces of the Crown. It may be frail—its roof may shake—the 
wind may blow through it—the storm may enter—the rain may 
enter—but the King of England may not enter!—all his force 
dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement! 
Historical Sketches of Statesman Who Flourished in the Time 
of George III 42 (1840). From Cicero: “What is more sacred, what 
more inviolably hedged about by every kind of sanctity, than the home 
of every individual citizen? . . . [I]t is a sanctuary so holy in the eyes of 
all, that it were sacrilege to tear an owner therefrom.” Marcus 
Tullius Cicero, De Doma Sua xli. 109 (N.H. Watts ed. & trans. 
1923). And from Hammurabi: “If a man makes a breach in a house, 
they shall put him to death in front of that breach and they shall thrust 
him therein.” Code of Hammurabi art. 21 (Robert Francis Harper ed. 
& trans., 2d ed. 1904) (ca. 1750 B.C.E.). 
183. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and 
Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1499 (1983) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  
184. See, e.g., L. Frank Baum, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz 45 (1900) 
(“There is no place like home.”). 
185. See, e.g., Gladiator 00:15:25–33 (DreamWorks Pictures 2000) 
(Emperor Marcus Aurelius: “How can I reward Rome’s greatest 
general?” Maximus: “Let me go home.”); The Lord of the Rings: 
The Two Towers 02:21:39–22:17 (New Line Cinema 2002) (Treebeard: 
“You are young and brave, Master Merry. But your part in this tale is 
over. Go back to your home.” Pippin: “Maybe Treebeard’s right. We 
don’t belong here, Merry. It’s too big for us. What can we do in the 
end? We’ve got the Shire. Maybe we should go home.”).  
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a haven. All citizens “wish at some point to draw a line, to pull the 
shades, and to turn inward . . . [in order] to contemplate [their] own 
thoughts and feelings.”188 Since privacy is “[a]t the very core” of what 
the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect, and the home is the epitome 
of privacy in our nation, it is a vitally important point that current 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence steadfastly protects it.189 The Court 
has used the reasonable expectation of privacy test to ensure 
continued protection of the home and the privacy interests it 
embodies, even in the face of modern technologies like electronic 
tracking and infrared surveillance. Cases like Karo and Kyllo therefore 
demonstrate two instances in which the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test has successfully protected citizens’ Fourth Amendment 
privacy interests. Even some of the commentators who have been 
most critical of the reasonable expectation of privacy test would seem 
to agree with this point. For instance, Professor Orin Kerr, though 
clearly critical of Katz, acknowledges that “an expectation of privacy 
becomes ‘reasonable’ . . . when it is backed by a right to exclude 
borrowed from real property,” which includes a citizen’s “reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his home.”190  
2. The Third-Party Doctrine:  
Societal Expectations and Effective Law Enforcement 
Most commentators critical of the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test would not seriously contest that the Court has gone to 
great lengths to protect privacy interests in the home. Rather, 
commentators’ worries lie largely in their belief that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test fails to protect expectations of privacy 
outside the home environment. In particular, many commentators 
express great concern about the Court’s application of third-party 
 
186. See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (holding 
that it is constitutional for towns to pass zoning codes that aim “to lay 
out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet 
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people”). 
187. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 & cmt. h (1965) 
(recognizing unauthorized entry into a home as tortious). 
188. Privacy, supra note 182, at xiv.  
189. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text; see also Wolf v. 
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The security of one’s privacy against 
arbitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment—is basic to a free society.” (emphasis added)). 
190. Kerr, supra note 6, at 809–10; see also Katz & Mazzone, supra note 7, 
at 373 (“[T]he Court’s focus on the warrant requirement and the 
requirement that exigency support warrantless searches [has] faded 
except in the context of home searches.” (emphasis added) (internal 
citation omitted)); Maclin, supra note 7, at 116–18 (arguing that Kyllo 
and future cases will limit Katz’s application to just the home).  
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doctrine in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.191 Though these 
commentators are correct that Katz offers less protection to privacy 
interests outside the home, this lower level of protection is not due to 
deficiencies in the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Rather, this 
lesser level of protection is due to a combination of long-standing 
precedent that predates Katz, society’s actual expectations, and the 
needs of balancing private citizens’ rights with those of efficient and 
effective law enforcement.  
The Court’s rulings in United States v. White192 and Smith v. 
Maryland193 received particular criticism from commentators for the 
manner in which they apply third-party doctrine to the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test.194 In White, the Court held that no 
reasonable expectation of existed, and thus no search occurred, when 
an undercover government agent wore a wire and recorded 
conversations with the defendant for later use at trial.195 Using similar 
reasoning, the Court in Smith concluded that citizens do not hold a 
reasonable expectation in the telephone numbers they dial because 
“[a]ll subscribers realize . . . that the phone company has facilities for 
making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list 
of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.”196  
The holdings of both White and Smith rested on the principle, 
well established before the Court ruled on Katz,197 that once a citizen 
 
191. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 158, at 511 (“‘[T]hird party doctrine’ 
must be strictly construed if the Fourth Amendment is to meaningfully 
limit government intrusions.”); Swire, supra note 167, at 907–08 (arguing 
that cases like Smith v. Maryland have created a “narrow scope of the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test”); Tomkovicz, supra note 157, at 
359 (criticizing third-party doctrine’s assumption “that a person suffers no 
violation or deprivation of confidentiality or secrecy if information about 
her life has been perceived or acquired because of the person’s choice to 
reveal or expose that information”); Weaver, supra note 6, at 1193–94 
(noting that since electronic communications and cloud computing are 
voluntarily conveyed to third parties (i.e., ISPs), the Court’s rulings in 
cases like Smith v. Maryland could indicate that such actions are not 
protected by the reasonable expectation of privacy test); Lawless, supra 
note 167 (criticizing third-party doctrine for permitting warrantless 
searches of Internet users’ search queries); see also supra Part III.A. 
192. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion); see 
supra Part III.A. 
193. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see supra Part III.A. 
194. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 7, at 75–78 (“[T]he protective shield of 
Katz was just as ineffective in Smith as it was in White.”).  
195. White, 401 U.S. at 749–51. 
196. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
197. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“Neither this 
Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth 
Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to 
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discloses information to a third party or the public, that citizen 
assumes the risk of that information coming to the attention of law 
enforcement.198 Several commentators criticized the Court for allowing 
this third-party doctrine to severely “limit” the reach of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test.199 “Limit” is a relative term in 
this context. Undoubtedly, if the Court were to do away with third-
party doctrine, a much greater range of actions and locations would 
be protected by the Fourth Amendment. But such a ruling would be 
inconsistent with both the holding of Katz itself and the societal 
expectations the reasonable expectation of privacy test purports to 
represent.  
On a most basic level, the third-party doctrine’s application to 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test makes intrinsic sense. As 
one commentator aptly put it, “How can someone have a ‘reasonable 
expectation of privacy’ in information shared with the public?”200 
Language right out of the Court’s opinion in Katz affirms this 
proposition: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”201 Even Professor Tomkovicz, who is critical of third-
party doctrine, admitted that this logic is persuasive: “The 
government does not intrude on core Fourth Amendment privacy 
values by perceiving what a person chooses to reveal or by receiving 
what an individual chooses to convey.”202 Put simply, it is 
unreasonable to expect information revealed to the public to remain 
private. A test based on the reasonable expectations of society simply 
cannot accord such information a legally recognized expectation of 
privacy. 
On a more practical level, it is important to keep in mind that for 
every expansion of Fourth Amendment protection, another restriction 
is placed upon the methods law enforcement officers can use to keep us 
safe. To a point, of course, this is a good thing—the fundamental 
 
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”); Lopez 
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) (“We think the risk that 
petitioner took in offering a bribe to [the law enforcement agent] fairly 
included the risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court, 
whether by faultless memory or mechanical recording.”). 
198. White, 401 U.S. at 752 (“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities 
must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the 
police.”); Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (“This Court consistently has held 
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”); see supra Part III.A. 
199. See supra note 195. 
200. Sklansky, supra note 171, at 202. 
201. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (emphasis added).  
202. Tomkovicz, supra note 157, at 359–60. 
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purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect citizens from unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion into their private and personal lives.203 
But there is also a point at which expansion of Fourth Amendment 
protection would begin to inhibit law enforcement too much. Achieving 
the proper balance between effective law enforcement and citizens’ 
Fourth Amendment rights is perhaps the American legal system’s 
greatest tug of war. As Professor Orin Kerr rightly pointed out, the 
goal of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is to achieve  
a workable and sensible balance between law enforcement needs 
and privacy interests. The law should allow the government to 
investigate crime effectively, . . . [but] must [also] limit the 
power of government, in order to protect privacy and civil 
liberties against excessive government snooping.204 
The Court’s application of third-party doctrine has, for the most 
part,205 done a good job of striking this balance.  
The most significant law enforcement technique that third-party 
doctrine preserves is the use of informants. As Judge Learned Hand 
once observed, “[c]ourts have countenanced the use of informers from 
time immemorial; in cases of conspiracy, or in other cases when the 
crime consists of preparing for another crime, it is usually necessary to 
rely upon them or upon accomplices because the criminals will almost 
certainly proceed covertly.”206 Chief Justice Warren once expounded 
upon the importance of undercover operatives to effective law 
enforcement:  
There are some situations where the law could not adequately 
be enforced without the employment of some guile or 
misrepresentation of identity. A law enforcement officer 
performing his official duties cannot be required always to be in 
 
203. This is evident from the text of the amendment: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
204. Kerr, supra note 6, at 861. 
205. While the reasonable expectation of privacy test adequately protects 
citizens’ Fourth Amendment privacy interests, there have been some 
questionable applications of third-party doctrine in the years since Katz. 
This issue is explored below in Part V.  
206. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950) (citing several 
Supreme Court decisions). 
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uniform or to wear his badge of authority on the lapel of his 
civilian clothing. Nor need he be required in all situations to 
proclaim himself an arm of the law. It blinks the realities of 
sophisticated, modern-day criminal activity and legitimate law 
enforcement practices to argue the contrary.207 
Chief Justice Warren’s assessment is particularly poignant against 
today’s backdrop of modern technology and the security threats our 
country currently faces. As one commentator aptly put it, 
“constitutional restraint on police investigation could become even 
more crippling if police are locked into using primitive surveillance 
devices, while criminals or terrorists are left free to take advantage of 
emerging technologies to evade, or even surveil, the government 
officials trying to stop them.”208  
Undercover informants help police catch dangerous criminals. Had 
the Court not upheld third-party doctrine in White, this invaluable209 
crime fighting technique would have been rendered effectively useless. 
Police would need probable cause to employ an undercover agent. But 
in most cases police would not have such probable cause until they 
were reasonably certain that the suspect was guilty. This raises two 
issues. First, achieving probable cause may be next to impossible in 
some cases without inside information—information that can only be 
obtained with a secret informant. More importantly, if police are 
reasonably certain that a suspect is guilty, they can just arrest him. 
As such, by the time they would have enough information to legally 
employ an informant, the informant would not be needed!210 Law 
enforcement efforts would be severely hampered if police could never 
use undercover agents. The Court has noted that such “practical 
realities” must be taken into account when answering Fourth 
Amendment questions.211 
As the example of undercover agents illustrates, third-party 
doctrine’s restriction of citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy is 
necessary. In an ideal world, all citizens would be free from secret 
government surveillance at all times. But it is simply not possible to 
 
207. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 315 (1966) (Warren, C.J., 
dissenting). 
208. Blitz, supra note 157, at 1413. 
209. The Supreme Court has recognized “that the informer is a vital part of 
society’s defensive arsenal.” McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967) 
(quoting State v. Burnett, 201 A.2d 39, 44 (N.J. 1964) (opinion of 
Weintraub, C.J.)).  
210. Kamisar et al., supra note 72, at 477. 
211. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 306 (1999) (holding that police 
officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ 
belongings found in the car if those objects are capable of concealing the 
object of the search).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century 
225 
achieve such a utopian ideal while maintaining adequate levels of 
effective law enforcement and national security. As one commentator 
stated the argument, “society can afford to erect strong privacy 
protections around the home and other private places only because 
police can begin their investigation outside of such private areas and 
gather the evidence necessary to decide what intrusions into private 
areas are really essential.”212 This argument sums up a delicate issue 
quite well—if society wants staunch protection of its most private 
places, it must accept that the efficient and effective pursuit of law 
enforcement requires reduced levels of privacy outside those areas. As 
such, commentators are correct to point out that the Court’s 
adherence to third-party doctrine in its Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has, in some ways, limited the amount of citizen 
privacy the reasonable expectation of privacy test is able to protect. 
But such limits are necessary to strike an adequate balance between 
citizens’ rights and effective law enforcement.  
Also, it is not as if there are no safeguards in place to restrain 
overly zealous law enforcement. Officers obtaining evidence in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment pay the ultimate price—that evidence can 
be deemed inadmissible in a criminal trial as the “fruit of the poisonous 
tree.”213 And even when a suspect speaks with a secret government 
informant, the scope of consent that the suspect has granted restricts 
the informant. As such, an undercover agent willingly admitted into 
one’s home or office cannot, for instance, rummage through drawers 
when that person steps into another room.214 The Court has also 
pointed out that “practical considerations”—such as “limited police 
resources and community hostility [to overly invasive tactics]—seem 
 
212. Blitz, supra note 157, at 1413. 
213. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); see also Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that evidence obtained 
during an unconstitutional search is suppressed in federal criminal 
trials); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires all states to abide by the Weeks suppression rule); 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (“What [the defendant] is 
assured by the trial right of the exclusionary rule, where it applies, is 
that no evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment will be 
introduced at his trial unless he consents.”).  
214. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305–06 (1921); see also Kamisar 
et al., supra note 72, at 461 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 
251–52 (1991) (“The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s 
consent . . . [under the Fourth Amendment is] that of ‘objective’ 
reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have 
understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? . . . It 
is very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the 
search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase 
within the trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper 
bag.”)). 
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likely to inhibit . . . proliferation” of unconstitutional search 
practices.215 Other procedural safeguards exist as well, such as the rules 
of evidence, placing the burden of proof on the government, juries, and 
laws enacted by legislatures, both state and federal. Such protections 
help ensure that third-party doctrine does not encroach onto citizens’ 
Fourth Amendment privacy interests.  
3. The Third-Party Doctrine and Privacy in Public Areas 
While the Court’s application of third-party doctrine in the Fourth 
Amendment context reduces citizens’ public privacy in some 
circumstances, the Court’s jurisprudence also indicates that third-party 
doctrine will not overrun all privacy interests outside the home. For 
instance, and contrary to the apparent fears of some commentators, the 
Court has made clear that it would not put up with dragnet-type 
surveillance of the American public—a 1984-like dystopia216 will not be 
making an appearance in American society any time soon.217 Such 
invasions of privacy are not, and never will be, permitted by the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Some commentators’ greatest fears lie in the potential invasions of 
privacy posed by technologies like GPS tracking and video 
 
215. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2002). 
216. George Orwell, 1984 (1949). 
217. See, e.g., Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied up in Knotts? GPS 
Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 409, 411 
(2007) (“Though the necessities of modern life may at times require the 
disclosure of discrete portions of our daily routine to the handful of 
private parties that provide us with services, it is unlikely most 
Americans would sanction pervasive monitoring by our government. If 
we are to avoid the Orwellian predictions of some conspiracy theorists, 
we must find meaningful ways to limit the government’s ability to keep 
tabs on us. The Fourth Amendment is our first line of defense.”); Brian 
J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth 
Amendment Protection, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 583, 600 (1989) (arguing 
that the Court’s Smith opinion “smacks of Orwell’s Big Brother, 
protection from which is the essence of the fourth amendment”); 
Weaver, supra note 6, at 1135 (“Today, eavesdropping and other 
surveillance technologies have gone high tech and created Orwellian 
possibilities for snooping.”). For what it is worth, the author rolls his 
eyes whenever a commentator puts forth such cliché 1984 references. 
Even if the Fourth Amendment has been reduced to as much of an 
irrelevancy as some commentators make it out to be (which this Note 
argues is not the case), every other right guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights would also have to be whittled away to similar irrelevancy before 
our society would even approach that of Orwell’s dystopia. And Justice 
Breyer, at least, would seem to agree. See Transcript of Oral Argument 
at 13, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/10-1259.pdf (referring to respondent’s reference to 1984 as 
overly dramatizing). 
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surveillance.218 Today’s “GPS-enabled surveillance allows a single 
person to remotely (and simultaneously) monitor the movements of 
one or more individuals for limitless periods or to determine their 
precise location at any moment,”219 and video surveillance could one 
day give the government the ability to virtually stop anyone on the 
street by simply pushing the pause button, “enhancing or magnifying 
detail, and electronically matching aspects of each person’s 
appearance against biometric or other databases.”220 While modern 
technology has indisputably made such government actions possible, 
the Fourth Amendment remains up to the task of defending citizens 
from unwarranted government intrusions. Even before the Court’s 
recent decision in Jones, there was abundant Supreme Court jurispru-
dence that indicates the High Court would not permit such extreme 
invasions of privacy.  
In Knotts,221 a case that received significant criticism for its 
allowance of warrantless electronic “beeper” surveillance of a car 
travelling on public highways,222 the Court limited its holding in 
several ways that will likely have significant impact on future Fourth 
Amendment decisions. At least one commentator pointed out that the 
Court, as it often does, limited its holding to just the beeper 
technology at issue in the case.223 As such, Knotts is not controlling 
precedent over other cases involving modern technology. The Court 
made this fact crystal clear in Jones.224 Further, the now almost 
arcane beeper technology at issue in Knotts is hardly similar to much 
more modern technologies like GPS. “[T]he appropriate constitutional 
treatment of GPS- [and video-] enhanced surveillance is not tied up in 
 
218. While the Court’s recent decision in Jones dealt with GPS technology, 
academic commentary and speculation about GPS technology and its 
impact on the Fourth Amendment is still very relevant because Jones 
was decided on the very narrow ground that the government obtained 
information by trespassing upon a constitutionally protected area. See 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); supra Part III.E 
(discussing Jones). As such, Jones left open several questions about the 
constitutionality of searches utilizing GPS technology. But such debates 
will likely be resolved in favor of citizen privacy interests. See infra Part 
IV.B.4 (analyzing Jones).  
219. Hutchins, supra note 217, at 413. 
220. Blitz, supra note 157, at 1356. 
221. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
222. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 7, at 83 (“[T]he result and reasoning of 
United States v. Knotts reveals the insignificance of Katz’s proclamation 
that the Fourth Amendment’s reach ‘cannot turn upon the presence or 
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.’”). 
223. Hutchins, supra note 217, at 457.  
224. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (noting that Knotts was not “relevant” to 
the Jones situation.).  
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Knotts because, as a factual matter, beeper and GPS technology are 
fundamentally different in terms of the quantity of information 
revealed by the science.”225 And, as Justice Sotomayor recently 
pointed out, GPS technology is highly intrusive, revealing much more 
information than the beepers at issue in Knotts could have ever 
uncovered.226  
Perhaps most importantly, the Court in Knotts strongly suggested 
that “dragnet-type” government surveillance practices would not be 
upheld under the Fourth Amendment.227 In response to the 
defendant’s argument that allowing unwarranted beeper surveillance 
would allow the government to conduct “twenty-four hour 
surveillance of any citizen of this country . . . without judicial 
knowledge or supervision[,]” the Court made clear that such 
surveillance was not at issue in Knotts and suggested that its holding 
would have been quite different under those circumstances: “[I]f such 
dragnet-type law enforcement practices as [the defendant] envisions 
should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine 
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”228 This 
language suggests that the Court would not, as some commentators 
fear,229 stand for the government placing all of this nation’s citizenry 
under constant surveillance. 
Just a few years after Knotts, the Court further suggested that 
dragnet government surveillance is unconstitutional. In Dow 
Chemical,230 the Court upheld the EPA’s warrantless use of high-tech 
cameras during a flyover of a chemical plant to inspect for violations. 
Despite this holding, the Court included noteworthy limiting language 
in its opinion that will likely prove significant in future Fourth 
Amendment decisions. The Court noted that the use of “highly 
sophisticated surveillance equipment . . . such as satellite technology, 
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”231 It went on 
to explain that, in this case, the photographs taken by the EPA were  
 
225. Hutchins, supra note 217, at 457.  
226. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s 
public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”).  
227. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284.  
228. Id. 
229. See, e.g., Blitz, supra note 157, at 1356 (arguing that “the absence 
of . . . constitutional limitation [of video surveillance] seems to leave 
authorities free to engage in a variant of the dragnet searches that the 
Fourth Amendment was clearly intended to prevent”). 
230. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
231. Id. at 238.  
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not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional 
concerns. Although they undoubtedly give [the] EPA more 
detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain limited 
to an outline of the facility’s buildings and equipment.232  
The Court further emphasized the lack of intimate details revealed by 
the EPA’s surveillance:  
No objects as small as . . . a class ring, for example, are 
recognizable, nor are there any identifiable human faces or 
secret documents captured in such a fashion as to implicate 
more serious privacy concerns. Fourth Amendment cases must 
be decided on the facts of each case, not by extravagant 
generalizations.233  
The Court’s strong emphasis on the revelation (or lack thereof) of 
intimate details indicates that it would not accept wholesale the 
extreme level of detail that could potentially be revealed about the 
everyday lives of American citizens by technologies like GPS and 
video surveillance. As one commentator argued, the language cited 
above from Dow Chemical suggests that the Court has incorporated 
an “intrusiveness inquiry” into the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test, the result of which is that the “Court’s existing framework 
. . . provides a meaningful safeguard against law enforcement’s 
unfettered use of GPS-enhanced tracking,” and presumably also video 
surveillance.234 Though the Court’s decisions that have followed Dow 
Chemical do not seem to use this inquiry explicitly, intrusiveness 
certainly does seem to play a role in the Court’s analysis. The 
discussion of the lack of “intimate details” revealed by the camera in 
Dow Chemical would have been unnecessary otherwise.235 Further, 
this past term in Jones, Justice Sotomayor noted that in future GPS 
surveillance cases she would look to the intrusive nature of GPS 
technology when determining citizens’ reasonable expectations of 
privacy.236  
The Court in Dow Chemical also pointed out that the property at 
issue was a business, not a home. The owners of businesses cannot 
reasonably expect the same level of privacy as homeowners because, 
unlike homes, businesses are not “free from any inspections.”237 
 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 238 n.5. 
234. Hutchins, supra note 217, at 458, 460. 
235. Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238. 
236. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  
237. Dow Chem., 476 U.S. at 238. 
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Finally, in Kyllo,238 the Court explicitly recognized the dangers 
posed to citizen privacy by modern technology and made clear its 
dedication to preventing unwarranted invasions of privacy. Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Kyllo eloquently rebutted the argument 
that the thermal imager at issue only picked up “off-the-wall” 
information about the defendant’s house, and thus did not constitute 
a Fourth Amendment search:  
But just as a thermal imager captures only heat emanating from 
a house, so also a powerful directional microphone picks up only 
sound emanating from a house—and a satellite capable of 
scanning from many miles away would pick up only visible light 
emanating from a house. We rejected such a mechanical 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, where the 
eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached 
the exterior of the phone booth. Reversing that approach would 
leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology—
including imaging technology that could discern all human 
activity in the home. While the technology used in the present 
case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account 
of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development.239  
Justice Scalia makes abundantly clear that the Court is well aware of 
the potential dangers modern technology poses to citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment rights. This knowledge, combined with the fact that 
Kyllo was unquestionably a victory for Fourth Amendment rights, 
indicates that the current Court is more than prepared to use Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy test to shield citizens’ privacy 
interests from the prying eyes of potential Big Brothers.  
4. The Impact of Jones on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
After more than a ten-year hiatus from deciding a Fourth 
Amendment case involving technology,240 the Court handed down a 
Fourth Amendment Decision involving GPS surveillance, United 
States v. Jones,241 in January 2012. Not surprisingly, in the short time 
between the Court’s decision and the writing of this Note, several 
commentators have already begun to criticize the opinion. Other 
 
238. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
239. Id. at 35–36. 
240. As noted above, see supra note 165, in 2010 the Court dealt with a 
Fourth Amendment case that involved text messaging, but sidestepped 
the technology issue and relied on already established principles of 
Fourth Amendment and employment law. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 
S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
241. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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commentators, however, have had positive reactions. This section 
summarizes the views of several of these commentators and also 
provides an analysis of Jones. It argues that Jones provides citizens 
with much reason to believe that the Court intends to wield the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test as a shield for privacy interests 
in future Fourth Amendment and technology cases. 
As with many of the Court’s other Fourth Amendment and 
technology decisions, several commentators have been highly critical 
of the holding in Jones. Professor Kerr noted that the case raises 
several new Fourth Amendment questions, including “[w]hat kind of 
‘trespass’ counts for purposes of [the majority’s trespassory] test?”242 
Kerr is critical of both Justices Scalia and Alito for not fully 
explaining the tests they used to determine the appropriate outcome 
of Jones.243 This lack of clarity, argued Kerr, “make[s] the decision a 
Rorschach test.”244 Tom Goldstein, a well-known appellate litigator 
and the co-founder of SCOTUSblog, argued that Jones is “less of a 
pro-privacy ruling than many people initially thought.”245 Goldstein 
criticizes the decision in Jones for failing to hold that installation of 
GPS tracking devices and short-term GPS monitoring are searches.246 
In what was possibly the harshest view of Jones expressed in the 
weeks following its release, Goldstein noted:  
I don’t see in Jones anything that remotely resembles a working 
majority on the Court for the conclusion that technological 
advances require the adoption of a new or broader conception of 
personal privacy. And I think it signals to the government that 
 
242. Orin Kerr, Three Questions Raised By The Trespass Test in United States 
v. Jones, Volokh Conspiracy (Jan. 23, 2012, 6:57 PM), http://volokh 
.com/2012/01/23/three-questions-raised-by-the-trespass-test-in-united-states 
-v-jones/. 
243. Orin Kerr, Why United States v. Jones is Subject to So Many Different 
Interpretations, Volokh Conspiracy (Jan. 30, 2012, 4:59 PM), http:// 
volokh.com/2012/01/30/why-united-states-v-jones-is-subject-to-so-many 
-different-interpretations/ (“Justice Scalia creates a new test for Fourth 
Amendment searches without being fully candid that he’s doing 
something quite new. . . . Scalia is so dismissive of Alito’s critique that it’s 
hard to know why Scalia sees Alito’s questions as so obviously 
answered. . . . Justice Alito spends only a single paragraph of his 14-page 
opinion explaining how he would resolve the Jones case. . . . And in that 
one paragraph, Alito is surprisingly unclear as to what he is doing.”). 
244. Id. 
245. Tom Goldstein, Why Jones is Still Less of a Pro-Privacy Decision than 
Most Thought, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 30, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www. 
scotusblog.com/2012/01/why-jones-is-still-less-of-a-pro-privacy-decision-
than-most-thought/. 
246. Id. 
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in many respects its investigatory efforts are not subject to the 
Fourth Amendment.247 
Another commentator noted that “the majority holding will soon be 
obsolete, because police don’t need to physically attach a tracker to 
your car to use GPS tracking.”248 And yet another criticized the Court 
for leaving “unsettled the question of how much protection one may 
expect from the Fourth Amendment in the digital age.”249 
Other commentators have been much friendlier to Jones. 
Professor Sherry F. Colb expressed that she felt “optimistic about the 
future of the Fourth Amendment” after reading Jones.250 She noted 
that while Justices Scalia and Alito disagreed on the appropriate test 
to apply in the case, they both “endorse the ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’ test.”251 Professor Colb rightly pointed out that “[t]he fact 
that Justices Scalia and Alito are battling over who best protects the 
privacy interests of the defendant should be quite exciting to fans of 
constitutional privacy.”252 Other commentators seem to share Colb’s 
optimism. One noted that Jones indicates that “a majority of the 
justices are prepared to apply broad privacy principles to bring the 
Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches into the digital 
age.”253 This commentator also cited with approval the expressions of 
Justices Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor 
demonstrating “discomfort with the government’s use of or access to 
various modern technologies.”254 Washington lawyer Andrew Pincus, 
who filed a brief on Jones’s behalf, called the Court’s decision a 
 
247. Id. 
248. Margot Kaminski, Reactions to US v. Jones, Info. Soc’y Project  
Yale L. Sch. (Jan. 24, 2012), http://yaleisp.org/2012/01/reactions-to-
us-v-jones/. 
249. Mike Sacks, Warrantless GPS Tracking Unconstitutional, Supreme 
Court Rules, Huffington Post (Jan. 23, 2012, 1:24 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/23/warrantless-gps-tracking-_ 
n_1224000.html. 
250. Sherry F. Colb, The Supreme Court Decides the GPS Case, United 
States v. Jones, and the Fourth Amendment Evolves, Verdict Justia 
(Feb. 15, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/02/15/the-supreme-
court-decides-the-gps-case-united-states-v-jones-and-the-fourth-
amendment-evolves-2. 
251. Id. 
252. Id.  
253. Adam Liptak, Justices Reject GPS Tracking in a Drug Case, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 24, 2012, at A1. This article also quotes Walter Dellinger, 
one of Jones’s attorneys, calling the decision “a signal event in Fourth 
Amendment history.” Id.  
254. Id. at A3.  
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“landmark ruling in applying the Fourth Amendment’s protections to 
advances in surveillance technology.”255 
It should come as no surprise that this Note agrees with those 
commentators with optimistic outlooks on the Court’s ruling in Jones. 
While commentators may be correct that the configuration of 
opinions in Jones is somewhat confusing, careful analysis of the 
Justices’ views paints a bright picture for both the future of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test and Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence in general.  
Let us begin with the majority opinion. Admittedly, the Jones 
majority did not rest its ruling on Katz and the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. But the opinion still abounds with 
reassuring language about both the Court’s continued dedication to 
protecting privacy rights and the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test’s continued viability. The Court began by noting that “our law 
holds the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his 
foot upon his neighbour’s [personal property] without his 
leave . . . .”256 Thus, the majority established from the start that 
citizens’ interest in being free from intrusions upon their personal 
property was a core issue in the case. This interest is at the core of 
the privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment257 and was 
unequivocally protected by the Court:  
[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . embod[ies] a particular concern 
for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, 
papers, and effects’) it enumerates. Katz did not repudiate that 
understanding . . . . By attaching the device to the Jeep 
[without a warrant], officers encroached on a protected area 
[and thus violated the Fourth Amendment].258  
While this was undoubtedly a narrow holding,259 the majority also 
made evident that it supported an expansive view of the Fourth 
Amendment. It noted that its trespassory analysis was not a 
 
255. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court: Warrants Needed in GPS Tracking, 
Wash. Post (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
supreme-court-warrants-needed-in-gps-tracking/2012/01/23/gIQAx7qGLQ 
_story.html. 
256. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (quoting Entick v. 
Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) 817). 
257. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949; Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 
596 (1989); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886). 
258. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950, 952 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). 
259. As Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence, the majority’s holding 
represented an “irreducible constitutional minimum,” which “supplie[d] 
a narrow[ ] basis for decision.” Id. at 955, 957 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
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substitution for, but rather an addition to, the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test.260 As such, it criticized Justice Alito’s concurring 
opinion for placing undue restrictions on the Fourth Amendment, 
“which would make Katz the exclusive test.”261 The Court noted that 
such an approach would pose “particularly vexing problems,” 
including creating a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that would fail 
to protect “that degree of privacy against government that existed 
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”262 Thus, the majority 
was clearly cognizant of the need to ensure that its ruling protected 
citizens’ privacy. The Court also made clear that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test remains the default test for when 
information is obtained in a non-trespassory fashion:  
Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals 
without trespass . . . remain subject to Katz analysis. . . . It 
may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, 
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy . . . .263 
The concurring opinions of Justices Sotomayor and Alito show 
even more promise for the protection of privacy interests. The most 
significant aspect of these opinions is that they both agree that long-
term GPS surveillance violates citizens’ reasonable expectations of 
privacy.264 This agreement will likely be of the utmost importance in 
future technology cases because it means that a majority of the Court 
(Sotomayor, Alito, and the three justices who joined Alito—Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kagan) is prepared to hold that warrantless long-term 
GPS monitoring is unconstitutional under the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test. This would be a huge victory for privacy advocates 
and clearly demonstrates that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
 
260. Id. at 952 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law 
trespassory test.”).  
261. Id. at 953. 
262. Id. at 950, 953 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). 
263. Id. at 953–54; see also United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 955 n.3 
(8th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court in Jones refused to overrule the 
Katz line of cases, stating that the cases are still good law with regard 
to whether the government has violated an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, but those cases do not address the second, ‘the 
common-law trespassory,’ prong of the Fourth Amendment analysis.” 
(citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–53)). 
264. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term 
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy.”); id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree 
with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’”). 
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test is capable of protecting citizens’ privacy from advancing 
technologies. Both opinions further recognize that citizens should not 
have to expect a lower level of privacy simply because technology has 
made it easier for the government to encroach upon privacy 
interests.265 As such, contrary to Tom Goldstein’s view, there actually 
does seem to be a “working majority on the Court” prepared to adopt 
“a new or broader conception of personal privacy.”266 
This is not to say that the Jones opinion raised no new questions. 
Most significant of these is the constitutionality of warrantless short-
term GPS surveillance. Justice Alito and the three justices joining 
him clearly think it would be constitutional.267 And, based on her 
concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor would likely hold it to be 
unconstitutional.268 The view of the remaining four justices in the 
majority remains somewhat unclear, though they may have suggested 
agreement with Justice Sotomayor when the majority opined that “[i]t 
may be that achieving the same result through electronic means, 
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of 
privacy.”269 But the uncertainty raised by this and other questions 
posed by Jones is hardly reason to criticize the opinion. The Court 
frequently resolves cases on narrow grounds, declining to “rush 
forward” and resolve issues that are not yet before it.270  
The important lesson from Jones is twofold: (1) all nine justices 
voted in favor of protecting the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights from a warrantless GPS search; and (2) a majority of the Court 
 
265. See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[S]ociety’s expectation has been 
that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the 
main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single 
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”); id. at 956 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Awareness that the government may be 
watching chills associational and expressive freedoms. . . . I do not 
regard as dispositive the fact that the government might obtain the 
fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional surveillance 
techniques.”).  
266. Goldstein, supra note 245 (“So I don’t see in Jones anything that 
remotely resembles a working majority on the Court for the conclusion 
that technological advances require the adoption of a new or broader 
conception of personal privacy.”). Considering the opinions, Goldstein’s 
observation is somewhat perplexing. 
267. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[R]elatively short-term 
monitoring of a person’s movements on public streets accords with 
expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.”).  
268. See id. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning whether, due 
to the extremely intrusive nature of GPS surveillance, warrantless use of 
such a surveillance technique would ever be constitutional).  
269. Id. at 954 (majority opinion).  
270. Id. 
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believes that long-term GPS surveillance is contrary to society’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy. These two things represent a 
significant victory for privacy advocates. That the Court is arguing 
about how best to protect privacy—as opposed to whether to protect 
it at all—bodes quite well for the proposition that Katz and the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test are up to the task of protecting 
citizens’ privacy interests from advancing technology.271  
C. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test in Lower Courts 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is not the only place we can 
find evidence of the reasonable expectation of privacy test’s continued 
viability in the technology context. Many lower courts have also 
applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test and the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment case law in a manner that successfully protects 
citizens’ privacy interests from modern technology. The areas of video 
surveillance and e-mail provide two telling examples.  
1. Video Surveillance 
Several federal circuit courts have held that citizens have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy against visual surveillance in private 
areas like homes and offices. The Seventh Circuit was the first to 
address this issue in detail. In United States v. Torres,272 federal 
agents, after obtaining the authorization of a magistrate as required 
under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 (“Title III”),273 installed television cameras in the apartment of 
several men suspected to be members of a notoriously violent Puerto 
Rican independence group.274 The cameras revealed that the men were 
building bombs in the apartment. The agents used this revelation to 
obtain a search warrant for the premises, and the men were 
ultimately charged with seditious conspiracy.275  
The Seventh Circuit, per Judge Posner, upheld the video 
surveillance of the apartment. It made abundantly clear, however, 
that the court viewed video surveillance differently from other, more 
traditional forms of surveillance. The opinion noted that if the police 
had not obtained authorization from a federal judge in accordance 
with Title III, the use of video surveillance would have violated the 
Fourth Amendment.276 The holding in Torres was largely based on 
 
271. See Colb, supra note 250. 
272. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).  
273. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006). 
274. Torres, 751 F.2d at 876–77. 
275. Id. at 876. 
276. See id. at 882–83, 885 (“[I]n declining to hold television surveillance 
unconstitutional per se [the Seventh Circuit does] not suggest that the 
Constitution must be interpreted to allow it to be used as generally as 
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the “indiscriminate” and “intrusive” nature of video surveillance, 
which the Seventh Circuit believed posed an even greater threat to 
citizens’ privacy than physical searches: “We think it also unarguable 
that television surveillance is exceedingly intrusive, especially in 
combination (as here) with audio surveillance, and inherently 
indiscriminate, and that it could be grossly abused—to eliminate 
personal privacy as understood in modern Western nations.”277 The 
Seventh Circuit’s concern with the privacy issues raised by video 
surveillance is certainly consistent with Katz and its reasonable 
expectation of privacy test. Thus, although it did not specifically 
reference the reasonable expectation of privacy test, it appears that 
the Seventh Circuit would have held the use of warrantless video 
surveillance unconstitutional as inconsistent with society’s expecta-
tions of privacy.278 
The Seventh Circuit’s recognition of the highly intrusive nature of 
video surveillance is important for another reason as well. Some 
surveillance technologies reveal so much information that, in order to 
accurately determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has 
been violated, it may one day become necessary to consider not only 
whether surveillance occurred, but also the surveillance technique’s 
 
less intrusive techniques can be used. . . . [A] warrant for television 
surveillance that did not satisfy the four provisions of Title III that 
implement the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of particularity would 
violate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
277. Id. at 882; see also id. at 887–88 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (explaining 
that Title III initially exempted electronic surveillance from its strict 
warrant requirements for national security purposes, but later repealed 
that exemption as part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (“FISA”), in order to protect 
citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy). FISA defines “electronic 
surveillance” as  
the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other 
surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio 
communication sent by or intended to be received by a 
particular, known United States person who is in the United 
States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting 
that United States person, under circumstances in which a 
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant 
would be required for law enforcement purposes . . . .  
 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (2006).  
278. In his concurring opinion, Judge Cudahy noted that the court should 
“construe Title III to apply to video surveillance for domestic law 
enforcement investigations where the targets of the surveillance have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.” Torres, 751 F.2d at 894 (Cudahy, J., 
concurring); see also Blitz, supra note 157, at 1378 (“Judge Posner’s 
decision [in Torres] subjected video surveillance within private homes or 
businesses to strict constitutional limits, intended to ensure that such 
surveillance takes place only when it is necessary.”). 
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level of invasiveness. The Supreme Court seems well aware of this 
issue. Justice Sotomayor, for instance, noted in her Jones concurrence 
that she would account for the invasiveness of GPS surveillance in 
future cases when deciding whether such surveillance is contrary to 
society’s reasonable expectations of privacy.279 Such an intrusiveness 
inquiry would not be without Fourth Amendment precedent. In Dow 
Chemical,280 the Court seemed to place great importance on the fact 
that the aerial surveillance at issue did not reveal “intimate details” 
and thus was not intrusive enough to raise a constitutional issue.281 
The Court has considered the degree of intrusiveness inherent in a 
search technique in several other Fourth Amendment cases as well.282 
Since the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Torres, at least six other 
federal circuit courts have handed down similar opinions with regard 
to video surveillance.283 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States 
 
279. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (“In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some 
unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will 
require particular attention. GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations. . . . I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring 
into account when considering the existence of a reasonable societal 
expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public movements.”). 
280. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
281. Id. at 238. 
282. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 106 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]n judging the reasonableness of a search pursuant to a 
warrant, which search extends to persons present on the named 
premises, this Court should consider the scope of the intrusion as well as 
its justification.” (emphasis added)); see also Bond v. United States, 529 
U.S. 334, 337 (2000) (finding that officer’s tactile search of a bus 
passenger’s luggage violated the Fourth Amendment because 
“[p]hysically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely 
visual inspection”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) 
(considering “the degree of intrusiveness upon personal privacy” caused 
by a police search of a defendant’s motor vehicle when deciding the 
constitutionality of the search (emphasis added)); United States v. 
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (deciding that although citizens have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their luggage, the warrantless use of 
drug dogs to sniff luggage does not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because a canine sniff “is much less intrusive than a typical search”). 
283. See Blitz, supra note 157, at 1378 n.154 (“Six other circuits have since 
[Torres] imposed the identical or nearly identical constraints on video 
surveillance and repeated the Seventh Circuit’s warning that video 
surveillance can be incredibly destructive of privacy and must be 
carefully limited.” (citing United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 411, 416 
(3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1438 (10th Cir. 1990); United 
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v. Nerber284 is a notable example. Prior to a drug deal, police 
installed, without first obtaining a warrant, a camera in the 
defendants’ hotel room and later attempted to use video from that 
camera as evidence at the defendants’ trial. The Ninth Circuit held 
the video surveillance to be unconstitutional under the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, noting that the “[d]efendants’ expectation 
to be free from hidden video surveillance when alone in [their] hotel 
room was . . . objectively reasonable.”285 Like the Seventh Circuit, the 
Nerber court was troubled by the inherent intrusiveness of video 
surveillance: 
[T]he legitimacy of a person’s expectation of privacy may 
depend on the nature of the intrusion . . . . “[E]very court 
considering the issue has noted [that] video surveillance can 
result in extraordinarily serious intrusions into personal 
privacy. . . . If such intrusions are ever permissible, they must 
be justified by an extraordinary showing of need.”286 
This language provides further support for the proposition that the 
intrusiveness of surveillance technology should be taken into account 
when determining what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Cases like Torres and Nerber demonstrate that, at least as far as 
video surveillance is concerned, Katz’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy test has succeeded in protecting citizens’ Fourth Amendment 
privacy interests in the lower courts. Further, the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test has permitted lower courts to create a 
blueprint that the Supreme Court can use for dealing with intrusive 
surveillance technologies.  
2. E-mail 
Perhaps even more significant to today’s society is the question of 
how the Fourth Amendment applies to searches of e-mail.287 Eighty-
 
States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 1987); United 
States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1986))).  
284. United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2000). 
285. Id. at 605. 
286. Id. at 603 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Koyomejian, 970 
F.2d 536, 551 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski, J., concurring)). The Nerber 
court also cited Judge Posner’s opinion in Torres, 781 F.2d at 882, 
noting that “television surveillance is exceedingly intrusive . . . [and] 
could be grossly abused to eliminate personal privacy as understood in 
modern Western nations.” See Nerber, 222 F.3d at 603–04.  
287. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(“This question is one of grave import and enduring consequence, given 
the prominent role that email has assumed in modern communication.”); 
see also id. at 286 (“Over the last decade, email has become ‘so 
pervasive that some persons may consider [it] to be [an] essential means 
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five percent of American adults now use the Internet and, as access 
continues to become both cheaper and more widespread, this number 
can only be expected to grow.288 With so many Americans using the 
Internet on a regular basis, electronic communications like e-mail are 
becoming citizens’ preferred mode of communication.289 As courts are 
beginning to recognize, “[e]-mail is almost equivalent to sending a 
letter via the mails.”290 In fact, the Supreme Court itself has 
recognized this similarity, albeit in a context outside the Fourth 
Amendment.291 As such, commentators argue that e-mail ought to be 
afforded the same level of Fourth Amendment protection as regular 
mail.292 Although the amount of case law is as of yet slim, several 
lower court opinions seem to agree with this analogy and have used 
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test to protect e-mail in a 
manner similar to that of regular mail.293  
 
or necessary instrument[ ] for self-expression, even self-identification.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 
2619, 2630 (2010))). 
288. Demographics of Internet Users, Pew Res. Center, http://www. 
pewinternet.org/Static-Pages/Trend-Data-(Adults)/Whos-Online.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
289. See, e.g., Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284 (“Since the advent of email, the 
telephone call and the letter have waned in importance, and an 
explosion of Internet-based communication has taken place.”). 
290. Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) 
(quoting United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. 
Ohio 1997)). 
291. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (“E-mail enables an individual 
to send an electronic message—generally akin to a note or letter—to 
another individual or to a group of addressees.”).  
292. See, e.g., Ray, supra note 169, at 234 (“Courts have recognized that 
sending an e-mail message is essentially the equivalent of sending a 
letter through the mail. As such, an e-mail message should receive the 
same protection as a letter sent through the mail and should not be 
intercepted without a warrant.”). 
293. At least one commentator seems to disagree on this point. See, e.g., id. 
at 210 (“[M]any courts have declined to find an expectation of privacy 
in e-mail or e-mail accounts.”). But such commentators tend to point 
towards e-mail cases that are decided under well-established concepts of 
either third-party doctrine or employment law. See, e.g., Rehberg v. 
Paulk, 598 F.3d 1268, 1281 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A person also loses a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in emails, at least after the email is 
sent to and received by a third party.” (emphasis added)); Ray, supra 
note 158, at 212 (“The Fourth Circuit has . . . found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in e-mail messages sent over an employer’s 
network.” (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 
392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000))). While responding to all lower court holdings 
regarding the Fourth Amendment and e-mail is outside the scope of this 
Note, the author would argue that these cases were decided correctly 
under the Court’s current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See City 
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Well-established Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that sealed 
mail may not be opened by the government absent probable cause 
and a warrant.294 Since e-mail affords a level of security greater than 
that of normal mail, it would make sense to hold that e-mail retains 
an expectation of privacy at least as great as that which society 
places in other mail.295 The holdings of several lower courts seem to 
indicate that this is indeed the trend.  
In United States v. Maxwell,296 a military court grappled with the 
warrantless search of an Air Force officer’s e-mail account. The court 
held that evidence resulting from this search had to be suppressed 
because “the transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a reasonable 
expectation that police officials will not intercept the transmission 
without probable cause and a search warrant.”297 The court then 
“conclude[d] that under the circumstances here appellant possessed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy . . . in the e-mail messages that he 
sent and/or received on AOL.”298 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court noted that e-mail communication is not unlike other forms of 
modern communication: “For example, if a sender of first-class mail 
seals an envelope and addresses it to another person, the sender can 
 
of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630, 2632 (2010) (“Although as a 
general matter, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment, there are a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions to that general rule. . . . [Warrantless searches 
that are] motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose . . . [and are] 
not excessive in scope [are reasonable].” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); LaFave, supra note 61, § 2.6(f) (“[A] letter 
writer’s expectation of privacy ordinarily terminates upon delivery of 
the letter.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); supra Part 
IV.B.2 (discussing the validity of third-party doctrine). In sum, the few 
cases that have dealt with e-mail outside the third-party doctrine and 
employment law contexts have used the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test to protect citizens’ privacy interests in their e-mail.  
294. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters and other 
sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at 
large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of 
such effects are presumptively unreasonable.”); Ex parte Jackson, 96 
U.S. 727, 733 (1887) (“The constitutional guaranty of the right of the 
people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and 
seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever 
they may be. Whilst in the mail, they can only be opened and examined 
under like warrant, issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the thing to be seized, as is required when papers are 
subjected to search in one’s own household.”). 
295. Ray, supra note 158, at 205 (citing LaFave, supra note 61, § 2.6). 
296. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).  
297. Id. at 418. 
298. Id. at 417. 
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reasonably expect the contents to remain private and free from the 
eyes of the police absent a search warrant founded upon probable 
cause.”299  
More recently, the Sixth Circuit dealt with a case involving a 
warrantless search of e-mail in United States v. Warshak.300 The 
defendants in Warshak were convicted of mail fraud, bank fraud, and 
money laundering.301 At trial, the evidence against them had been 
based in large part upon 27,000 e-mails that law enforcement officials 
obtained from Warshak’s Internet service provider (“ISP”) without a 
warrant.302 In a line of reasoning similar to that found in Maxwell,303 
the Sixth Circuit noted the Fourth Amendment protections afforded 
regular mail by Ex parte Jackson304 and United States v. Jacobsen305 
and then stated that 
Given the fundamental similarities between email and traditional 
forms of communication, it would defy common sense to afford 
emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection. . . . Email is the 
technological scion of tangible mail, and it plays an indispensable 
part in the Information Age.306  
Based on this reasoning, the Sixth Circuit held that citizens 
unequivocally “enjoy[ ] a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of emails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a 
commercial ISP.”307 As such, the Sixth Circuit used Katz’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test to protect citizens’ privacy interests in 
their e-mail. 
 
299. Id. (citing Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)). 
300. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
301. Id. at 275. 
302. Id. at 282. 
303. In fact, the Warshak court cited Maxwell to support the proposition that 
senders of e-mail expect the contents of their messages to remain 
private. See id. at 284 (citing United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 
417 (C.A.A.F. 1996)). 
304. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1887).  
305. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).  
306. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–86. 
307. Id. at 288. The reader should note, however, that the Sixth Circuit 
ultimately held that the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case 
because law enforcement officials relied in good faith upon the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”) when they obtained Warshak’s e-mails 
from his ISP. Id. at 288–92. The court ensured that future good faith 
defenses would not succeed by holding that “to the extent that the SCA 
purports to permit the government to obtain such emails warrantlessly, 
the SCA is unconstitutional.” Id. at 288.  
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The Warshak court further demonstrated the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test’s ability to protect citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment interests by explaining why third-party doctrine fails to 
frustrate citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail. 
Some commentators have pointed to third-party doctrine as a major 
reason why the reasonable expectation of privacy test will fail to 
protect citizens from warrantless e-mail searches.308 Warshak shows 
why these worries lack foundation by differentiating between the 
distinct acts of conveying a communication to an intermediary and 
conveying a communication to the general public. Since it is 
impossible to send an e-mail without it passing through the ISP’s 
servers, “the ISP is the functional equivalent of a post office or a 
telephone company.”309 Once this reality is acknowledged, it is clear 
that third-party doctrine does not destroy citizens’ reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their e-mail. “[T]he police may not storm 
the post office and intercept a letter, and they are likewise forbidden 
from using the phone system to make a clandestine recording of a 
telephone call.”310 Since the ISP and its servers are the e-mail 
equivalent of a post office or phone company, it stands to reason that 
the police also may not compel ISPs to turn over a subscriber’s e-mail 
without triggering the Fourth Amendment. This line of reasoning 
further demonstrates that Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
test is capable of protecting citizens’ privacy interests in the most 
important of all modern technologies: the Internet.  
V. The Judiciary vs. The Legislature:  
Determining Society’s Expectations 
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, ample case law 
exists from both the Supreme Court and lower federal courts 
demonstrating Katz’s continued ability to protect citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment rights in this age of advancing technology. Most 
importantly, the High Court consistently demonstrates steadfast 
support of citizens’ privacy rights in the most private of all places—
the home.311 Outside the home, there is also significant language in 
 
308. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 6, at 1193–94 (noting that since electronic 
communications and cloud computing are voluntarily conveyed to third 
parties (i.e., ISPs), the Court’s rulings in cases like Smith v. Maryland 
could indicate that such actions are not protected by the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test). 
309. Warshak, 631 F.3d at 286. 
310. Id.  
311. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the Court’s steadfastness in 
protecting the privacy of the home). 
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cases like Knotts,312 Karo,313 Dow Chemical,314 and Kyllo315 to suggest 
that dragnet-type law enforcement surveillance would not be upheld 
under the current framework created by Katz.316 And, most recently 
the Court protected a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights in his 
public movements in Jones.317 Rulings in lower courts protecting citi-
zens’ privacy from warrantless searches in the realm of video 
surveillance and e-mail further demonstrate the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test’s continued vitality in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.318 
None of this is to say, however, that Katz’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test is perfect in every way. The abundant 
legal scholarship arguing to the contrary makes that clear. Any legal 
standard based upon the reasonable expectations of society presents 
courts “with a hard issue.”319 But the important point is that this 
issue is the “correct” one.320 Since the primary goal of the Fourth 
Amendment is to protect citizens from unregulated government 
intrusion,321 it only makes sense to look to society’s expectations of 
privacy when determining the bounds of the Amendment.  
While other commentators recommend logical replacements for 
the reasonable expectation of privacy test, these tests either: (1) ask 
questions that are just as difficult to answer as the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test;322 or (2) advocate for bright-line rules at 
 
312. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  
313. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).  
314. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
315. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
316. See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing public privacy). 
317. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
318. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test in lower courts). 
319. LaFave, supra note 61, § 2.1. 
320. Id. 
321. See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (“[T]his Court 
has interpreted the [Fourth] Amendment as establishing rules and 
presumptions designed to control conduct of law enforcement officers 
that may significantly intrude upon privacy interests.”). 
322. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 8, at 1026 (“The reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard should be abandoned in favor of a test that reclaims 
the original language of the Fourth Amendment—the right to be secure. 
Removing the reasonable expectation of privacy from our Fourth 
Amendment discourse will resolve some of the confusion that has 
plagued jurisprudence in the post-Katz era.”); Henderson, supra note 
158, at 546 (arguing in favor of “jettisoning the [reasonable expectation 
of privacy] test in favor of a dictionary definition of search”). 
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the expense of determining what level of privacy society actually 
expects.323 The reasonable expectation of privacy test, though not 
infallible, asks the right question and typically achieves just results. 
This Note urges commentators to realize that, whatever test is used 
for determining privacy expectations, it will not always be easy to 
reach “correct” conclusions. The reasonable expectation of privacy 
test has performed well to this point, and the Court’s recent ruling in 
Jones seems to point toward similarly promising results in the future. 
One aspect of the Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
jurisprudence, however, does warrant further discussion. As noted 
above, the Court’s application of third-party doctrine in the 
reasonable expectation of privacy context has spurred significant 
scholarly debate.324 And this debate can only be expected to grow as 
citizens transmit more and more information over the Internet. As 
Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her Jones concurrence:  
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach 
is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great 
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the 
course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone 
numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the 
URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they 
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, 
groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers.325  
Thus, the issue of third-party doctrine, and how it relates to the 
Fourth Amendment and technology, is almost certainly an issue that 
the Court will face in future cases. This final Part explores whether 
courts or legislatures are best suited for determining society’s privacy 
expectations with relation to modern technology. It concludes that 
there are benefits and drawbacks to each branch of government 
making such determinations and that it would be unwise to allocate 
all responsibility for such decisions to just one of them. This Part 
then goes on to make a modest suggestion. Courts should explicitly 
recognize that social policy plays a significant role in determining 
society’s privacy expectations. As such, courts should adopt a policy 
of looking to legislative treatment of novel technologies in determining 
how those technologies implicate societal expectations of privacy. 
 
323. See, e.g., Penney, supra note 160, at 506 (arguing that the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test should be replaced with an “[e]conomically-
informed cost-benefit analysis”). 
324. See supra Parts IV.B.2–3. 
325. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
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Such a policy will help ensure that courts stay in tune with what 
society deems a reasonable expectation of privacy in this age of ever-
advancing technology.  
A. Courts or Legislatures? 
Courts admittedly have institutional limitations that at times make 
it difficult for them to accurately assess society’s expectations. This is 
particularly true in the field of technology, since courts often “lack the 
institutional capacity to easily grasp the privacy implications” of 
rapidly changing technology.326 To help overcome this inherent 
difficulty, a good case can be (and has been) made that courts should 
take a back seat to legislatures in making decisions about advancing 
technology. 
On a basic level, the determination of society’s expectations 
clearly has a major social policy aspect. As such, at least one lower 
court has argued that decisions regarding the impact of advancing 
technology on citizens’ privacy rights are policy decisions that ought 
to be left to the legislature.327 Professor Kerr has argued that, due to 
the institutional limitations of courts, judges often have trouble 
grasping the privacy implications of new technologies because they do 
not have time to fully learn how those technologies will develop.328 
Due to these circumstances, Professor Kerr believes that “legislative 
rule-creation offers significantly better prospects for the generation of 
balanced, nuanced, and effective investigative rules involving new 
technologies.”329 Legislatures, he argues, have a level of flexibility the 
courts do not have, which allows them to adapt more readily and 
amend laws as technology quickly changes—an ability that courts in 
our legal system simply lack.330 Kerr also points out that court-made 
law is almost always ex post, that is, it looks back at situations that 
have already occurred and fashions a rule for that past occurrence.331 
Such law, Kerr urges, causes the common law to lag behind legislation 
in the context of rapidly advancing technology, which typically looks 
to the present and future.332 
 
326. Kerr, supra note 6, at 858. 
327. United States v. McNulty, 47 F.3d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1995) (“As new 
technologies continue to appear in the marketplace and outpace existing 
surveillance law, the primary job of evaluating their impact on privacy 
rights and of updating the law must remain with the branch of 
government designed to make such policy choices, the legislature.”). 
328. Kerr, supra note 6, at 858–59. 
329. Id. at 859. 
330. Id. at 871. 
331. Id. at 868. 
332. Id. 
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Though Professor Kerr makes several good points, many 
commentators are hesitant to abandon the common law in an area of 
law that is becoming increasingly important to citizens’ everyday lives 
and has such significant constitutional implications.333 Also, the 
legislature’s ability to handle technological issues is perhaps not quite 
as straightforward as Professor Kerr argues. While Congress can often 
respond more quickly to technological advances than courts, it is 
unlikely to frequently revisit issues once it has passed legislation on 
them.334 Put simply, legislatures tend to have a short attention 
span.335 As such, legislative decisions are just as prone to becoming 
outdated by the rapid advance of technology as judicial opinions are. 
In some circumstances this may create even greater confusion than 
what might result from outdated common law. While the judicial 
community is constantly evaluating and reevaluating the common 
law, congressionally enacted statutes may remain untouched for long 
periods of time. In the context of rapidly advancing technology, such 
statutes could actually become “straitjackets” that hamper the 
growth and development of the technology they seek to regulate. 336  
 
333. See, e.g., Blitz, supra note 157, at 1467 (arguing that, although 
legislatures have considered laws setting special warrant requirements 
for high-tech surveillance, “courts should insist on similar requirements 
as a constitutional matter. Even when a state or locality is unwilling to 
protect the character of its public space, this does not mean that 
individuals within that state or locality should therefore be without 
safeguards against intrusive video monitoring that undercuts core 
Fourth Amendment interests”); Swire, supra note 167, at 905 
(criticizing Professor Kerr’s argument that “Congress can do a better 
job than the courts at creating the law for high-tech surveillance” and 
arguing that “Fourth Amendment [jurisprudence] should continue to 
play a role in governing electronic surveillance and other high-tech 
searches. At a minimum, the Court should announce basic principles for 
how surveillance can be conducted, with Congress then supplying the 
details”). 
334. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the 
Common Law in Cyberspace, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 309, 312 (2002) 
(“[L]egislation designed to address questions raised by rapidly changing 
technology is likely to become obsolete equally [as] quickly [as court 
decisions] . . . . [O]nce Congress has enacted legislation regulating a 
particular subject, it is unlikely to revisit the issue for some time.”). 
335. See, e.g., Advocacy Over and For the Long Term, Cmt’y Tool Box, 
http://ctb.ku.edu/en/tablecontents/sub_section_main_1267.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2012) (“Unfortunately, as short as the attention span of 
the public sometimes is, that of legislators and other policy makers is 
often even shorter—for many, no longer than the time between 
elections.”). 
336. Sherry, supra note 334, at 312. An apt example of Congress being too 
hasty in passing laws regulating a modern technology is its reaction to 
the rise of the railroad. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Congress passed a series of laws intended to regulate railroad shipping 
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There is also something to be said against rejecting the common 
law system upon which our legal system is based. The beauty of the 
common law system is its recognition that the best legal rules are 
achieved by pitting two zealous advocates against one another, 
allowing them to delve into and explain the redeeming qualities of 
each side of the problem, and then allowing a neutral arbiter to decide 
which among those arguments is best. By replicating this process 
hundreds and hundreds of times for virtually every possible legal 
topic, our legal system creates a pseudo-democracy for arriving at 
optimal legal solutions.337 This process would be lost in the technology 
arena by giving the legislature sole decision-making authority over 
technological privacy issues. 
Many of the privacy issues presented by advancing technology 
would be largely uncontroversial at the congressional level. For 
instance, who doesn’t want the privacy of his e-mail to be protected? 
But such unopposed legislation is dangerous. Without a strong voice 
for the opposing side, the potential for poorly drafted laws greatly 
increases, and with enough such “easy” decisions to make, there is 
also the potential that Congress will put off making more difficult and 
controversial choices.338 As another commentator argues, putting 
decisions about the privacy implications of technology solely in the 
hands of the legislature could result in a reduction of citizens’ 
rights.339 Historically, law enforcement authorities, when left un-
checked by the courts, have been able to influence Congress to pass 
laws requiring less regulation of law enforcement tactics.340 Multiple 
 
rates and thus prevent monopolies. These laws remained unchanged 
until 1970. In the interim, the automobile and airplane rose to 
prominence, thus eliminating the possibility of a railroad monopoly on 
interstate shipping and travel. Rather than serving to prevent a 
monopoly, the rate-regulating laws ended up leading to the bankruptcy 
of many railroads. Id. at 312–13. 
337. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L.J. 1743, 1745 
(1995) (“What is special about the common law . . . is its constructive 
function. What recommends it is the process that it offers, with its 
partial answers, to repeated if slightly varied questions, in a range of 
contexts with a world of different talent and ideals. If, as Levi said, the 
common law is democratic, it is democratic not because many people get 
to vote together on what the law should mean, but because many people 
get to say what the common law should mean, each after the other, in a 
temporally spaced dialogue of cases and jurisdictions. Unlike other 
lawmaking, what defines the process of the common law is small change, 
upon which much large change gets built; small understandings with 
which new understandings get made.”). 
338. See Sherry, supra note 334, at 314–15. 
339. Swire, supra note 167, at 914–16. 
340. See id. at 914–15 (offering the events of September 11, 2001 and the 
USA PATRIOT Act as an example of this proposition). 
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commentators have also pointed out the inarguable fact that Congress 
often looks to the rulings of the Supreme Court and other lower 
courts in coming to decisions about legislation.341 Putting the 
determination of technological privacy interests solely in the hands of 
legislatures would deprive those bodies of this benefit. 
With the foregoing arguments in mind, it appears there is no 
clear-cut answer to the question of which branch, the legislative or 
judicial, is best suited to deal with advancing technology. While the 
judiciary may be somewhat slower in responding to technological 
advancement due to the backward-looking nature of deciding cases, 
the common law system allows it to constantly reevaluate past 
decisions. The legislature, on the other hand, offers the potential to 
respond to technological advancements rapidly by quickly passing 
legislation. But such speed is at times, as one commentator coyly put 
it, “expended careening around blind corners.”342 Legislatures have 
short attention spans. Sometimes they act quickly, but then fail to 
touch on an issue again for a long time, which may ultimately result 
in more harm than good. As such, it does not appear wise to alter the 
status quo in the technological privacy arena. Each branch should 
continue to deal with such questions as they arise. This will ensure 
that an adequate system of checks and balances continues to exist 
between these two branches.343 
B. Legislative Insight into Society’s Reasonable Expectations 
This does not mean, however, that intra-branch improvements 
cannot be made. Courts do, at times, fail to correctly assess societal 
expectations.344 To remedy this, it would be useful for courts to 
 
341. See, e.g., id. at 915–16 (“Supreme Court decisions have played a 
primary role in prompting and shaping privacy legislation to date. 
Congressional actions, when they have occurred, have generally given 
far less protection than the Fourth Amendment norm of probable cause 
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.”); Lessig, supra note 337, at 
1753 (“Constitutional law is fundamentally concerned with who should 
decide what constitutional questions when. My suggestion here is that 
we rely for the moment on lower court judges, to give the law the 
material with which to understand this new realm.”). 
342. Sherry, supra note 334, at 317. 
343. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 167, at 913–14 (arguing that “courts and 
Congress working together can likely produce better results than 
Congress alone”); see also infra note 368 for an example of this system 
at work. 
344. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). In this case, the 
Court, applying third-party doctrine, held that citizens do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records because checks, 
deposit slips, and financial records 
are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments 
to be used in commercial transactions. [They] . . . contain only 
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explicitly recognize that the determination of society’s reasonable 
expectations has a distinct social policy component. With this fact in 
mind, courts should adopt a policy of looking to the way legislatures 
have dealt with novel technologies in determining how those 
technologies implicate societal expectations of privacy.345 Such a 
policy would recognize the legislature’s role in determining social 
policy. By including such analysis in Fourth Amendment and 
technology jurisprudence, courts can look to legislatures for valuable 
insight into societal expectations while the many benefits of the 
common law system are still retained. In addition, maintaining a 
strong presence by both branches in the realm of Fourth Amendment 
technology law will ensure continued discourse between the legislature 
 
information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to 
their employees in the ordinary course of business. 
Id. at 442. This ruling misconstrued societal expectations. Does society 
really think it unreasonable for citizens to believe that their bank 
records are entitled to at least some privacy?  
Congress ultimately remedied this situation, passing the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641, which 
prohibited government officials from accessing or obtaining “copies of, or 
the information contained in[,] the financial records of any customer 
from a financial institution unless [one of several exceptions applies].” 
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 § 1102, 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2006). 
This situation demonstrates why having both the judiciary and 
legislature making privacy decisions is the optimal situation. If one 
missteps, the other can step in with curative measures.  
345. The D.C. Circuit utilized reasoning comparable to this suggestion in its 
ruling in Jones. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563–65 
(D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Though the D.C. Circuit’s result was affirmed on 
other grounds by the Supreme Court, its reasoning still demonstrates how 
this Note’s recommendation would work. In determining whether Jones 
had a reasonable expectation to be free from GPS surveillance for thirty 
days, the D.C. Circuit found significant that the California legislature had 
“specifically declared [that] ‘electronic tracking of a person’s location 
without that person’s knowledge violates that person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy,’ and implicitly but necessarily thereby required a 
warrant for police use of a GPS.” Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564 (citing Cal. 
Penal Code § 637.7 (West 2010)). It also noted that several other states 
have enacted similar statutes. See id. (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-
4, 77-23a-7, 77-23a-15.5 (LexisNexis 2008); Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 626A.37, 626A.35 (2009); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 934.06, 934.42 (West 
2006); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-30-140 (Supp. 2011); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 
13, §§ 176.6, 177.6 (2011); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 803-42, 803-44.7 (1993); 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5761 (West 2000)). The D.C. Circuit 
concluded that “these state laws are indicative that prolonged GPS 
monitoring defeats an expectation of privacy that our society recognizes as 
reasonable.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, using a line of reasoning 
virtually identical to the one this Note espouses, the D.C. Circuit looked 
to how legislatures had handled the question of GPS surveillance in 
determining whether Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
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and judiciary and maintain a healthy system of checks and balances. 
Such discourse, in the long run, should lead to optimal results. 
The realm of e-mail provides an example of how this policy would 
achieve desirable results. As noted above, the Court has yet to deal 
with a Fourth Amendment case that implicates the Fourth 
Amendment and e-mail.346 The recent decision by the Sixth Circuit in 
Warshak 347 provides a promising example of how the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test can be applied in a manner that protects 
citizens’ e-mail privacy. But this is not the only place the Court 
would be able to look if it had to rule on a Fourth Amendment e-mail 
case tomorrow. Congress, in its capacity as representative of the 
people, has legislated heavily on privacy and electronic 
communication. Under this Note’s proposed policy, the Court would 
also look to how Congress has handled e-mail in determining what 
society’s privacy expectations in e-mail are. 
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act,348 which amended federal wiretap law to include electronic 
communications. The aim of the Act is to “protect privacy interests in 
personal and proprietary information . . . [and prevent] the unauthor-
ized interception of electronic communications.”349 The Act explicitly 
includes e-mail in its definition of “electronic communications”350 and 
requires law enforcement officers to apply to a federal judge for 
permission to intercept e-mail communications.351 The Senate Report 
noted that, at the time, legal protections for electronic mail were 
“weak, ambiguous, or non-existent, and that electronic mail [was] 
legally as well as technically vulnerable to unauthorized surveillance.”352 
The Senate passed the Act to remedy this situation and “to ensure the 
continued vitality of the fourth amendment.”353 The Senate Report also 
noted that “[p]rivacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical 
protection, or it will gradually erode as technology advances. Congress 
must act to protect the privacy of our citizens.”354  
 
346. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
347. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).  
348. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510–2522 (2006)). 
349. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1, 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. 
350. Id. at 8 (including a definition of “electronic mail” in the report’s 
glossary of terms that count as communications).  
351. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006). 
352. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 4. 
353. Id. at 5. 
354. Id.  
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If the Supreme Court were to adopt the policy this Note suggests 
and make a point of looking at how legislatures have handled 
technologies that are novel355 to the Court, the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act and accompanying Senate Report would make its 
decision in a Fourth Amendment case involving e-mail relatively 
straightforward. Let us assume a case with the following fact pattern: 
Charles is suspected of conducting illegal gambling activities online. 
Law enforcement officials, without obtaining a warrant, intercept 
several of Charles’s e-mails, which lead to his arrest and conviction for 
illegal gambling. Charles appeals, alleging that the e-mail evidence 
should have been suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”356 Charles 
loses his appeal below and the Supreme Court grants certiorari.  
When Charles’s case comes before the Supreme Court, the Court’s 
decision would hinge on whether Charles had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his e-mail communications. Some of the Justices might 
look to third-party doctrine to determine the outcome of Charles’s 
case. Under this reasoning, Charles’s chances of winning may be slim, 
since almost all e-mails pass through a third-party ISP before 
reaching the intended recipient.357 Thus, since Charles conveyed his e-
mail messages to a third party, some Justices might argue he no 
longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in them under long-
standing Supreme Court precedent.358 But is this really true? As 
Justice Sotomayor noted in Jones,  
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the 
warrantless disclosure to the government of a list of every Web 
site they had visited in the last week, or month, or 
year . . . [even though] [p]eople disclose the . . . URLs that they 
visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to 
their Internet service providers.359  
Justice Sotomayor’s observation seems to make a lot of sense. Just 
because all information passed over the Internet goes through an ISP 
 
355. In this context, “novel” is intended to mean a technology the Court is 
hearing a case about for the first time. 
356. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). 
357. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010). 
358. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 734, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court 
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” (citing 
multiple Supreme Court opinions, including United States v. White, 401 
U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion))).  
359. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century 
253 
should not mean it loses all Fourth Amendment protection360—
millions of people disclose very personal information over the Internet 
every day, sometimes even while performing the simplest of tasks.361 
Holding that third-party doctrine deprives all of this information of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy is simply an approach that “is ill-
suited to the digital age.”362 
If the Court were to have, as this Note advocates, a policy in 
place for looking to how the legislature has dealt with e-mail 
technology, it would see that a strict application of third-party 
doctrine to e-mail is inconsistent with society’s privacy expectations. 
The Electronic Communication Privacy Act and the Senate Report 
accompanying it make abundantly clear that citizens do expect a 
certain degree of privacy in their e-mail.363 Indeed, one of the primary 
aims of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act was to protect 
citizens’ “privacy interests.”364 If such an expectation has been 
statutorily recognized by Congress—the representative of the people—
the Court cannot possibly hold that citizens do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in e-mail. As one commentator pointed out, 
“[t]he people’s voice in the governmental context is the legislature and 
when the legislature expressly recognizes an expectation of privacy, a 
court should not find that expectation socially unreasonable.”365 Thus, 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable Charles’s expectation of 
privacy in his e-mail and the Court should rule in his favor. This 
ruling would also be consistent with Warshak,366 the only federal 
circuit court opinion that has thus far addressed e-mail in the Fourth 
Amendment context.367  
By looking to legislative reaction to novel technology, courts will 
be able to more accurately gauge societal expectations, which will lead 
to a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that continues to protect 
 
360. See id. (“I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed 
to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason 
alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
361. Id. (“[In the digital age,] people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.”).  
362. Id. 
363. See, e.g., Ray, supra note 158, at 225-27 (arguing that when Congress 
passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, “it 
explicitly recognized the public’s expectation of privacy in electronic 
communications”). 
364. S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. 
365. Ray, supra note 158, at 226 (internal citation omitted). 
366. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).  
367. See supra Part IV.C.2 (addressing how lower courts have applied the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test in the context of e-mail). 
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citizens’ privacy interests. This is not to say that courts should 
always rule based on what a legislature has done. But at least in the 
context of society’s expectations as they relate to new technologies, 
legislatures can often provide courts with a window into the psyche of 
society and thus what society truly deems to be “reasonable.”  
Conclusion 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis once observed that “[t]he 
intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing 
civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and 
man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more 
sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more 
essential to the individual.”368 This observation is even truer now than 
it was then. The rapid advance of technology in today’s society has 
made it increasingly easy for the government to peer into citizens’ 
private lives. In some ways this is a good thing—it makes for more 
efficient and effective law enforcement. But as Warren and Brandeis 
pointed out, citizens do not always want to be in the public eye—they 
need at least some privacy. The Supreme Court understands this and 
protects citizens’ privacy interests by holding unconstitutional any 
warrantless search that violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.369 
As this Note has demonstrated, the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test has been able to protect citizens’ privacy interests, even 
in the face of modern technology. Most importantly, the Supreme 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been steadfast in its 
protection of privacy in the home.370 Additionally, language in several 
of its Fourth Amendment and technology opinions indicates that 
citizens also have a reasonable expectation of privacy in public.371 The 
Court’s recent ruling in Jones and the concurring opinions 
accompanying it bode well for continued protection of citizens’ public 
privacy rights.372 Further, in areas such as video surveillance and e-
mail searches—Fourth Amendment issues that the Court has yet to 
rule on—lower courts seem to be applying the reasonable expectation 
 
368. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. 
L. Rev. 193, 196 (1890). 
369. See supra Part II (discussing the background of Katz and the 
establishment of the reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
370. See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the Court’s protection of privacy in 
the home).  
371. See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing how the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence indicates that citizens have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in some public places). 
372. See supra Part IV.B.4 (analyzing the majority and concurring opinions 
in Jones). 
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of privacy test in a manner that protects citizen privacy.373 Such 
results further indicate that the Court’s current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is up to the task of protecting privacy interests from the 
specter of advancing technology.  
But this is not to say that the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test is perfect in every way. As noted above, determining what society 
reasonably expects is not an easy task.374 But when the privacy 
expectations of this nation’s citizens are on the line, it is the right 
question to be asking. As courts move forward in this age of 
advancing technology, they should be cognizant of the policy 
determinations involved in gauging societal expectations. Since social 
policy is often best determined by legislatures, it makes sense for 
courts to look to how legislative bodies have dealt with novel 
technologies when determining society’s expectations of privacy. Such 
a policy will help courts accurately reflect societal expectations and 
ensure that the will of the people, as expressed by the legislature, is 
sufficiently protected by future Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.375  
Katz is not dead yet, nor will its grave be dug anytime soon, so 
long as courts stay in tune with societal expectations and continue to 
apply the reasonable expectation of privacy test in a manner that 
protects citizens’ reasonable privacy interests from encroachment by 
law enforcement’s use of advancing technology. 
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373. See supra Parts IV.C.1–2 (discussing lower courts’ application of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test).  
374. See LaFave, supra note 61, § 2.1 (describing the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test as presenting courts “with a hard issue”); supra note 324 
and accompanying text. 
375. See supra Part V.B (arguing that courts passing Fourth Amendment 
judgment on novel technologies should look to legislatures for guidance 
on how to determine what society deems a reasonable expectation of 
privacy).  
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